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Abstract 
In the coming decades, Europe’s energy system is facing a number of challenges. Some of 
these, such as the enhanced greenhouse effect and depletion of fossil fuel resources have a 
worldwide dimension. Consequently, the strategies for tackling these issues must be designed 
taking worldwide developments into account. Alternative energy sources and new technologies 
will have to play a key role. In the analysis of the potential impact of new technologies and the 
evaluation of possible policy options, energy - economy - environment (E3) models can provide 
useful insights. In the CASCADE MINTS project, these E3 models have been used to evaluate 
possible developments of the world energy system and the implications for Europe. 
 
The objectives of this report are first to document the baseline assumptions and results in the 
project as a basis for analysis of policy cases. Secondly the report aims at providing information 
to policy makers, based on a scientific consensus among modellers, on possible developments in 
a world with moderate GDP and population growth, with no additional policies in place. The 
variety of technological and other assumptions in the different models causes a range in the re-
sults that reflects the uncertainty inherent to any projection of future developments. 
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POLICY BRIEF 
In the coming decades, Europe’s energy system is facing a number of challenges. Some of 
these, such as the enhanced greenhouse effect and depletion of fossil fuel resources have a 
worldwide dimension. Consequently, the strategies for tackling these issues must be designed 
taking worldwide developments into account. Alternative energy sources and new technologies 
will have to play a key role. In the analysis of the potential impact of new technologies and the 
evaluation of possible policy options, energy - economy - environment (E3) models can provide 
useful insights. In the CASCADE MINTS project, twelve of these E3 models have been used to 
evaluate possible developments of the world energy system and the implications for Europe. 
 
This policy research comes right at a time when the EU has started a reflection on the actions on 
climate change for the post-2012 period1, especially considering the benefits and costs and tak-
ing into account both environmental and competitiveness concerns. 
 
The policy brief provides an outlook on global and European energy developments towards 
2050, summarising the main results generated by these models. It reflects the scientific consen-
sus among modellers concerning the baseline presented and the main policy messages included 
in this brief. Although all models confirm the major trends, there are sometimes significant dif-
ferences among individual model results, reflecting the different dynamics and assumptions and 
indicating the impact of uncertainties in the future energy system. The graphs, presented in this 
policy brief, show projections from different models, and should be regarded as illustrative of 
the discussed trends, by no means the only possible paths. The models used in the baseline pro-
jections are: PRIMES, PROMETHEUS, MARKAL, MESSAGE, POLES, GMM, PACE, TIMES-EE, 
NEWAGE-W, NEMESIS, NEMS and DNE21+. 
 
Developments against a background of moderate economic growth 
The outlook is based on a common, harmonised baseline scenario. The baseline will serve as a 
benchmark against which policy scenarios will be compared in later stages of the project. It is 
based on the B2 scenario from the IPCC Special Report on Emissions Scenarios, because this 
scenario is characterised by a moderate economic and demographic growth. Some assumptions 
of major importance in this scenario are listed below. 
                                                 
1 See http://europa.eu.int/comm/environment/climat/future_action.htm.  
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Figure P.1 Development of GDP per region and share of these regions in world GDP 
 
In all regions of the world, the average GDP growth in the period 1990-2050 is lower than in 
1950-1990. Asia shows by far the highest growth, while the economies in Western Europe, 
North America, Japan and Australia grow at a lower pace than the other world regions. This in-
creasing dominance of the developing countries has a direct impact on energy consumption and 
greenhouse gas emissions. Despite the economic ‘catch up’, income differences between indus-
trialised and developing countries remain significant. 
 
Population growth is in line with current population trends and based on the UN median popula-
tion projections from 1998. Global population increases to about 9.4 billion people by 2050.  
Population growth is highest in the developing countries in Africa, Latin America, and the Mid-
dle East. It is significantly lower in Asia and North America, whereas the population of both 
Europe and the Former Soviet Union remains almost constant until 2050. 
 
Oil prices reflect assumptions of low to moderate resource availability. In the period 2000-2050, 
the world oil price is projected to increase from 4.2 to 6.2 Euro2000/GJ, which is equivalent to a 
range of ca. 26 to 38 US$95/barrel. Obviously there is a great deal of uncertainty to this assump-
tion. 
 
Only instrumented policies in force or approved on December 31st 2003 have been included in 
the baseline scenario. Moreover, some representation of climate policy or emission trading for 
the region of Europe has been included. This is reflected in a generic carbon tax of 10 
Euro2000/tonne CO2 as from the year 2012. 
 
A continuing worldwide reliance on fossil fuels 
World primary energy consumption is expected to more than double in 2000-2050. This is a 
consequence of the assumptions regarding moderate economic and population growth, implying 
that a larger growth would also be possible. In line with the assumptions, Asia grows fastest, 
and quadruples its energy consumption by 2050. 
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Figure P 2 Development of primary energy consumption by regions  
 
All models indicate that fossil fuels are expected to remain dominant in the world fuel mix by 
supplying 65-80% of primary energy use (Figure P.3). Combined with the growth in primary 
energy consumption, this will result in an even faster depletion of the global natural resources 
than today. Although Europe’s primary energy consumption shows a much slower growth than 
the world average - some 20% until 2030 -its reliance on fossil fuels (70-75% of the primary 
energy mix, depending on the model), is comparable to the rest of the world. 
 2050 
76%
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75%
4% 
21%
Fossil fuels
Nuclear
Renewables
Western  
Europe 
World 
 
Figure P.3 Fuel mix of primary energy consumption in the world and Western Europe, 2050 
 
Although the models show a consistent picture of the share of fossil and non-fossil fuels in fu-
ture primary energy mix, they deviate on the contributions of individual fuels. In Europe, par-
ticularly the prospects of solid fuels and nuclear energy differ, due to different assumptions on 
technological development and costs. The power generation sector plays a key role in these fuel 
and technology choices. Coal consumption is expected to stabilise or grow. Some models expect 
nuclear energy to be phased out, due to high costs. There is a certain consensus on Europe’s 
consumption of natural gas for power production, which is expected to increase significantly, 
and on the moderately increasing consumption of oil, mainly in the transport sector. Develop-
ments of energy prices may play a key role here. 
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 On world level, a similar variation in projections exists. One of the models includes constraints 
on sulphur emissions, which induce a smaller share of particularly solids, and a substitution 
with nuclear and renewables. 
 
 
These observations have the following implications for Europe. 
• Europe will encounter more competition on increasingly scarce fossil resources. Given 
the limited domestic resource base, the growing dependency on imported fuels, par-
ticularly oil and natural gas, will bring about more risks of high prices and supply dis-
ruptions. 
• The differences in projections of the primary energy mix indicate that there is room for 
fuel switch, particularly in the power sector. The results indicate that the future devel-
opment of use of energy sources may substantially be influenced by policies, such as 
emissions regulations and stimulating non-fossil fuels. Moreover, high oil and gas 
prices might accelerate changes in Europe’s energy mix. 
 
 
Energy savings increasingly important 
Europe’s energy intensity is among the lowest in the world. In the current baseline projections, 
Europe is expected to maintain this leading role. However, as illustrated in Figure P.4, the scope 
for further efficiency improvements is more limited than in other world regions. On the other 
hand, Europe’s energy consumption per capita is more than twice the world average, and keeps 
increasing. The increasing trend is in line with developments in other world regions. 
 
 
0 
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20 
25 
2000 2010 2020 2030 
[PJ/bln€ ] 
US New Member States World Western Europe  
Figure P.4 Europe’s energy intensity of GDP compared to other world regions 
 
• Recognising that Europe’s energy consumption is substantial but relatively efficient, 
policy measures should focus on stimulating energy savings in order to slow down 
the steady growth in energy consumption of the average European citizen. 
 
 
Security of supply becomes a key issue 
Given the continuing global reliance on fossil fuels, an important issue in the years to come will 
be the increasing dependence on oil from the Middle East. Although the models show different 
projections of the evolvement of oil production, they agree that the contribution from the Mid-
dle East region grows, and becomes substantially larger. Given the large uncertainty on future 
oil price developments, confirmed by one of the models indicating that there is a substantial 
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probability of sudden increases in the oil price, this may lead to increased concerns about the 
security of oil supply on the longer term, particularly in view of the present uncertain political 
situation in the Middle East. 
 
For Europe, trends are in line with the global developments. Europe’s oil consumption is ex-
pected to stabilise at about a third of its primary energy consumption in 2030. Domestic produc-
tion however is expected to decrease due to limited reserves and high production costs, thereby 
introducing a greater reliance on imports up to 85% (Figure P.5).  
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
2000 2010 2020 2030
Imports (Russia and FSU)
Imports (Africa, Latin America, Middle East)
Natural gas production (Western Europe)
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20%
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Figure P.5 Shares of production and imports of oil and natural gas (Western Europe) 
 
For natural gas, Europe’s external dependency will also grow in the next decades. A continuing 
growth in gas consumption combined with a decrease of gas production in the UK, the Nether-
lands and Norway, will lead to a higher share of imports from the two main suppliers Russia 
and Algeria. Additionally, the accession of the new Member States and their heavy reliance on 
supplies from Russia increases the risks related to gas supply security. 
 
There is another dimension to security of supply than dependency on imported fuels. The level 
of diversification is inversely related to the dependence on a few primary fuels, and is related to 
the correlation between the fuels in terms of costs and availability. The level of diversification 
may further influence the sensitivity of Europe to fuel supply disruptions. 
 
• Europe’s dependence on oil from the Middle East is expected to increase significantly in 
the next decades. Given the prospect that other world regions will also increasingly rely 
on oil from this region, this may indeed lead to further oil price increases, which will af-
fect all economic sectors. 
• An increase in diversification – for instance a growing contribution from renewables – 
may to a certain extent alleviate the increase in external dependence for oil and gas. In 
the current analysis, the models show large differences in their projections of Europe’s 
future fuel mix, and thus in the expected level of diversification. This suggests that new 
policies may be required to stimulate an increased uptake of renewables or other 
sources. 
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 The challenge of climate change remains 
It is highly likely that global warming is attributable to human activities, in particular to emis-
sions of greenhouse gases. All models project a continuing growth of these emissions, of which 
CO2 is the most important one. Overall, the CO2 emissions in 2030 are expected to be approxi-
mately twice the level of 1990, the base year of the Kyoto protocol. The largest growth is ex-
pected to occur in the developing world, in particular in Asia. There is a large variation in emis-
sions projections between models, related to the differences in the primary energy mix, particu-
larly the share of fossil fuels. These differences are due to different assumptions on technologi-
cal development and the associated technology costs. 
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
[Gton]
 
Figure P.6 Range among models in average energy related CO2 emissions projections 
 
In Europe, CO2 emissions grow moderately, when compared to trends at world level (Figure 
P.7). Still, Western Europe is not on track towards the targets agreed under the Kyoto Protocol. 
Western Europe is committed to achieving an 8% reduction of CO2 emissions by 2008-2012, as 
compared to the level in 1990. This means that in this period, the level of total CO2 emissions 
(including non-energy uses) should not exceed approximately 3100 Mton per year. However, all 
models indicate that the energy-related CO2 emissions alone are already expected to exceed this 
level. The carbon tax of 10 euro/(ton CO2), included from 2012 onwards to reflect the assump-
tion that some type of climate policies will be implemented, does not suffice to curb the grow-
ing trend in greenhouse gas emissions. 
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Figure P.7 Range among models in average energy related CO2 emissions projections in 
Western Europe 
 
• The results clearly indicate that under current policies, Europe will have severe difficul-
ties achieving its Kyoto target. Therefore, additional instruments, such as emissions 
trading with countries outside Europe (Annex A), based on the JI and CDM instru-
ments, may have to play a key role in meeting Kyoto commitments. 
• Beyond 2012, a moderate carbon tax appears to be insufficient for curbing the trends in 
Europe, as emissions are expected to continue their growth with some 0.4% annually. In 
the rest of the world - in the absence of international incentives or regulation for mitiga-
tion - carbon emissions are expected to increase at a much higher pace, particularly in 
the developing countries. Therefore post-Kyoto policies will need to be developed. 
Given the large inertia in the energy system, short-term action is needed to foster the in-
troduction of advanced and cleaner technologies, in order to enable these technologies 
to play a significant role in the long term. 
 
 
Outlook: strategies and directions 
The analysis presented in this report has identified some major challenges that the world is fac-
ing today. The findings are in line with the Commission WETO report2 and the IEA World En-
ergy Outlook 2004 (IEA, 2004). In the next phases of the CASCADE MINTS project, several 
strategies will be explored that may help to counter these developments. 
 
Renewables are indigenous and CO2 neutral, and therefore may improve diversification, and 
avoid greenhouse gas emissions. However these technologies still face financial and other barri-
ers, and will have to be stimulated ‘down the learning curve’. Questions to be explored include 
the amount of support necessary and the potential of these sources. 
 
Similarly, nuclear power is an energy supply option that may help mitigating the greenhouse 
effect, but comes with other problems, such as the waste issue and the lack of political consen-
sus. 
 
                                                 
2 See http://europa.eu.int/comm/research/energy/gp/gp_pu/article_1257_en.htm. 
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 CO2 capture and storage is an alternative way to combat climate change while continuing the 
use of fossil fuels, but many technical and institutional issues still need to be solved. The project 
will evaluate the conditions and policy instruments that are required to make CO2 capture and 
sequestration in old gas and oil fields or in aquifers become environmentally and economically 
feasible. 
 
Finally, the project will explore the prospect of a hydrogen economy, which may potentially 
transform the complete energy system. The project will evaluate the costs, required R&D ef-
forts, and policy measures in an integrated analysis. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 The CASCADE MINTS project 
The current report presents results of Part 2 of the CASCADE MINTS project (CMP2). This 
project involves the development and use of energy and energy/economy models with special 
emphasis on analysing technological developments. The CASCADE MINTS project is split into 
two distinct parts: 
• Part 1 focuses on modelling, scenario evaluation and detailed analysis of the prospects of the 
hydrogen economy. It involves extensive development and use of detailed energy models 
that have received assistance from previous framework Programmes of DG Research. The 
ultimate aim of this part of the project is to enable perspective analysis of the conditions un-
der which a transition to an energy system dominated by hydrogen is possible. 
• Part 2 does not involve significant model development. Its main aim instead is to use a wide 
range of existing operational energy and energy/economy models in order to build analytical 
consensus (to the extent that this is possible) concerning the impacts of policies aimed at 
sustainable energy systems. This part builds on the experience obtained in the ACROPOLIS 
project (Das et al, 2003), funded by DG Research within the 5th Framework Programme and 
involves common exercises carried out using a wide variety of models. This part involves 
modelling teams from both inside and outside the EU. The emphasis is placed on evaluating 
the effects of policies influencing technological developments. 
 
This policy research comes right at a time when the EU has started a reflection on the actions on 
climate change for the post-2012 period, especially considering the benefits and costs and tak-
ing into account both environmental and competitiveness concerns. 
 
 
Modelling possible 
configurations of a 
hydrogen economy and 
using models to study its 
prospects 
Joint case studies 
on policy issues 
with  
operational  
energy models 
PART 1 PART 2
Coordinator: NTUA Coordinator: ECN 
Administrative Coordinator: NTUA  
 
Figure 1.1 Overview of the CASCADE MINTS project 
Part 2 of the project consists of six work packages. Five of these involve modelling work, and 
one work package is devoted to reporting and dissemination. This report presents results of the 
first work package on harmonisation of initial assumptions and evaluating a common baseline 
projection. In each of the next four work packages a set of common case studies will be ana-
lysed with the participating modelling teams. These work packages are briefly summarised be-
low. 
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 Renewable energy (WP 2.2) 
Renewable energy sources have the potential to play a much larger role than they presently do. 
However, targets for steadily increasing the share of renewables prove difficult to achieve. What 
are the consequences of different targets in 2020? What is an optimal share for renewables un-
der different CO2 mitigation and import dependency constraints? Under what conditions and by 
means of which policy instruments can the 2020 target of a 20% renewable energy share (of 
primary resources) be reached? What is the related impact on GHG emission reduction and im-
port dependency in 2020 and 2050? What mix of renewable technologies (solar, wind, biomass, 
geothermal) will be applied in which sectors? 
 
Nuclear energy (WP 2.3) 
Nuclear power currently accounts for approximately one-third of the electricity generating ca-
pacity in the EU and is therefore a main topic in the current debate concerning security of en-
ergy supplies in the EU and the reduction of GHG emissions. Replacement of existing nuclear 
power plants puts even more stress on both policy issues. Important issues which will shape the 
future trends in the nuclear sector, are the problems of managing nuclear waste, the economic 
viability of the new generation of nuclear power plants, the safety of reactors in eastern Europe, 
in particular Candidate Countries and the policies to combat climate change and improve the 
security of supply. The main research question that will be addressed is under what conditions 
and by means of which policy instruments will new nuclear power plants become environmen-
tally and economically feasible? What will be the potential impact of nuclear energy in terms of 
GHG emission reduction and improving of supply security in 2020 and 2050? 
 
CO2 capture/storage (WP 2.4) 
CO2 capture and sequestration will always come with an additional cost to any power generation 
plant. This is true both for the conversion to electricity and the conversion to hydrogen, if hy-
drogen is used as an energy carrier. CO2 capture and sequestration will therefore only be applied 
if future specific or general policies provide the necessary financial incentive. Under what con-
ditions and by means of which policy instruments will CO2 capture and storage in old gas and 
oil fields as well as aquifers become environmentally and economically feasible? Considering 
different possible policy strategies to intervene and to stimulate CO2 capture and storage becom-
ing a mature technology, what is the potential impact of CO2 capture and storage in terms of 
GHG emission reduction in 2020 and 2050? 
 
Trade offs and synergies (WP 2.5) 
The final work package forms the link between Part 1 and Part 2 of the project. It integrates WP 
2.2 (renewable energy), WP 2.3 (nuclear energy), WP 2.4 (CO2 capture/storage) and WP 1.2 
(hydrogen). 
 
1.2 Report overview 
The objectives of this report are first to document the baseline assumptions and results in the 
project as a basis for analysis of policy cases. Secondly the report aims at providing information 
to policy makers on possible developments in a world with moderate GDP and population 
growth, with no additional policies in place. The variety of technological and other assumptions 
in the different models causes a range in the results that reflects the uncertainty inherent to any 
projection of future developments. 
 
The report is structured as follows. Chapter 2 introduces all models involved in the project and 
classifies and clusters these in order to provide a framework for interpreting their results. Chap-
ter 3 documents the assumptions, which the modelling teams agreed to harmonise. Next, Chap-
ters 4 and 5 provide the main results of the baseline projections for the world and Europe, re-
spectively. Finally, Chapter 6 presents the key messages formulated on the basis of previous 
chapters. 
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2. ENERGY MODELS IN CASCADE MINTS PART 2 
2.1 Classifying different types of energy models 
In the CASCADE MINTS Part 2 (CMP2) project, 15 different models will be used to help un-
derstand the policy questions related to climate change and security of supply. The models are 
representative of the variety of analytical approaches used in current energy and climate policy 
analysis. Generally, different studies use different models, or only a limited set of models, 
which may cause difficulty in interpreting the differences in outcomes. Hence, the project aims 
at starting off with a comparison of various models, providing a background for understanding 
possible different outcomes when using different models. Building on this comparison, the 
CMP2 project will provide the specific outcomes from each of the 15 models and synthesise the 
results. Each model will provide different insights to energy policy issues because of its design; 
therefore a range of policy effectiveness may be determined. This chapter will provide an over-
view of the different models participating in the CMP2 project, and classify and cluster these in 
order to provide a framework for analysing their results. Table 2.1 lists all models by coverage 
and affiliation. 
 
Table 2.1 General overview of the models used in CASCADE MINTS Part 2 
Model Geographical 
coverage 
No. of 
Regions 
Affiliation Participating in 
work packages 
Global, US, Canada 
AIM World 21 NIES, Japan Baseline, renewables 
DNE 21+ World 77 RITE, Japan All 
ETP World 15 IEA, France From fall 2004 ready 
to participate 
GMM World 5 PSI, Switzerland All 
MESSAGE World 5 IIASA, Austria All except Nuclear 
NEWAGE World 13 IER, Germany All 
POLES World 38 IPTS, Spain All 
PROMETHEUS World 3 NTUA, Greece All except CCS 
NEMS USA 5-32 EIA, USA All 
MAPLE Canada  NRCan, Canada All 
Europe 
MARKAL Western Europe 1 ECN, Netherlands All 
NEMESIS Europe 16 ERASME, France All 
PACE World 9 ZEW, Germany All except CCS 
PRIMES EU-25 countries 25 NTUA, Greece All except CCS 
TIMES-EE Europe 19 IER, Germany All 
 
Three of these models have not participated in the current phase, for various reasons. The ETL 
model of the IEA, and the MAPLE model of Natural Resources Canada are still under devel-
opment. The AIM/CGE model of NIES in Japan is currently being upgraded and was for this 
reason not available. These three institutes participate in the CASCADE MINTS project without 
EU funding. 
 
Annex A provides a summary overview of model characteristics as provided by the respective 
institutes, used for the classification. Generally, a distinction is made between ‘bottom-up engi-
neering models’ which provide a detailed representation of the energy system and satisfy a 
given energy demand with least cost supply, and ‘top-down energy economy models’ which de-
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 scribe the interaction between the economy as a whole and the energy sector but lack techno-
logical detail. Presently, most energy models are hybrids that attempt to compensate the draw-
backs of the two approaches. The classification draws on the taxonomy of energy models pro-
vided by (IPPC-TAR, 2001). 
 
2.1.1 Top-down models 
Top-down models usually describe the entire economy in aggregate terms, drawing on analysis 
of historical trends and relationships to predict large-scale interactions between the energy sec-
tor and the rest of the economy. They incorporate relatively little detail on energy use and tech-
nological development. Top-down modelling approaches are further classified into two groups. 
• Macro-economic models. These models are usually simulation models, describing invest-
ment and consumption patterns in various sectors. They implicitly reflect past behaviour in 
that the driving equations are estimated using econometric techniques on time-series data. In 
the CMP2 project, only the NEMESIS model, a Neo-Keynesian macro econometric model 
with detailed energy/environment module for Western Europe, falls into this category. 
• Computable General Equilibrium Models. CGE models construct the behaviour of eco-
nomic agents based on microeconomic principles. The models typically simulate markets 
for factors of production (e.g., labour, capital, energy), products, and foreign exchange, with 
equations that specify supply and demand behaviour. The models are solved for a set of 
wages, prices, and exchange rates to bring all of the markets into equilibrium. CGE models 
examine the economy in different states of equilibrium and so are not able to provide insight 
into the adjustment process. The parameters in CGE models are partly calibrated and partly 
statistically or econometrically determined. In the CMP2 project, three CGE models will be 
used. AIM/CGE, PACE and NEWAGE are global models. PACE provides a detailed repre-
sentation of the power sector. 
 
2.1.2 Bottom-up models 
Typically, a bottom-up engineering model incorporates detailed data on costs and efficiencies of 
a wide range of available and new technologies, and describes energy use in great detail. Based 
on these data, the model determines a (least cost) strategy for satisfying exogenously deter-
mined final or useful demand for energy services. These models incorporate relatively little de-
tail on non-energy consumer behaviour and interactions with other sectors of the economy. 
They tend to provide results in which technological progress plays a key role, because they dis-
regard market thresholds and non-technical barriers. Bottom-up approaches can be further clas-
sified into two categories. 
• Dynamic Energy System Optimisation Models. These technology-oriented models minimize 
the total costs of the energy system, including all end-use sectors, over a time horizon of 
several decades and thus compute a partial equilibrium for the energy markets. Recent ver-
sions allow demand to respond to prices. Some models link aggregate macroeconomic de-
mand and energy demand. Technology learning is endogenous in some models. This class of 
models is well represented in the CMP2 project. DNE21+, GMM, ETP and MESSAGE are 
global models. The models differ in their regional and technological coverage and their in-
corporation of technology learning. For Europe, MARKAL describes the Western European 
energy system as a whole, while TIMES-EE describes the electricity production sector in 
the EU-15 plus Norway, Switzerland, Poland and Czech Republic. 
• Integrated Energy-System Simulation Models. Integrated energy-system simulation models 
are bottom-up models that include a detailed representation of energy demand and supply 
technologies, which include end-use, conversion, and production technologies. Demand and 
technology development are driven by exogenous scenario assumptions often linked to 
technology vintage models and econometric forecasts. The demand sectors are generally 
disaggregated for industrial sub-sectors and processes, residential and service categories, 
transport modes, etc. In this category, the largest variation of methodologies can be found. 
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POLES is characterised as a recursive simulation model of the world energy market, while 
PRIMES, NEMS and MAPLE have in common a ‘generalised equilibrium’ structure, mean-
ing that they formulate the behavioural conditions for economic agents in a variety of for-
mulations for separate sub models, which are solved by a market clearing algorithm. 
 
Finally, one model remains to be classified. The PROMETHEUS model is a stochastic model of 
the world energy system. It could be regarded a bottom-up model without fitting in one of the 
categories listed above. 
 
2.1.3 Classification summary 
Summarising, the models participating in CMP2 provide a variety of methodologies giving 
complementary information. Not surprisingly, more energy sector models are involved in the 
CMP2 analysis than macro economic ones. Still, it should be stressed that no classification does 
justice to the richness of approaches. Many of the models have ‘hybrid’ characteristics reflect-
ing the attempts that modellers have made to adjust for specific drawbacks of a given approach. 
 
 Top-down Bottom-up 
Geographical 
coverage 
Macro-economic CGE Energy System  
Optimisation 
Integrated Energy 
System simulation 
 
Global 
 
  
AIM 
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MESSAGE 
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PROMETHEUS 
 
US,  
Canada 
   NEMS 
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Europe 
 
NEMESIS 
  
MARKAL Europe 
TIMES-EE 
 
 
PRIMES 
Figure 2.1 Classification summary 
 
World 
As illustrated in Figure 2.1, eight different models will provide projections of global energy sec-
tor developments. Three of these are top-down (CGE) models, which will study macro-
economic feedbacks on energy policies. Four of the others are energy system optimisation mod-
els that will provide the bottom-up technology rich perspective. Furthermore, one stochastic 
model will shed more light on the role of uncertainties and one integrated energy system simula-
tion model is available. Moreover, two integrated energy system simulation models describe the 
US and Canada energy systems. 
 
Europe 
When it comes to modelling policy cases within Europe, four different models are available, 
whereas most of the global models distinguish enough regions to be able to focus on Europe as 
well. One of the ‘European’ models (NEMESIS) provides the macro economic point of view, 
two energy systems optimisation models (MARKAL and TIMES-EE) provide the bottom-up 
perspective using different regional classifications, while one integrated energy-system simula-
tion model (PRIMES) also pays attention to behavioural aspects. 
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 3. KEY ASSUMPTIONS FOR HARMONISATION 
3.1 Introduction 
In modelling, the effects of policies are analysed by comparing a situation in which the policy is 
implemented to a situation in which no action is taken. Thus, when considering the impact of 
policies, an image of the world has to be constructed in which none of the policies that are under 
scrutiny are included. As such an image serves as the baseline against which scenarios will be 
compared, it is generally called the baseline scenario. 
 
The models used in the CASCADE MINTS project are too diverse to define a truly common 
baseline scenario. Therefore, instead of attempting to define a common baseline scenario, an 
approach is followed where a set of basic assumptions are harmonised. Thus, a baseline scenario 
is defined for each model separately, subject to the requirement that some of the initial condi-
tions have to be harmonised. The objective of this harmonisation is to allow for a common basis 
for comparing baseline results and policy cases. This provides more insight in the range of re-
sults supplied by the different models. Moreover, it enables a better identification of the sources 
of discrepancies among the results. 
 
Different levels of harmonisation may be chosen for the baseline, depending on the desirability 
and feasibility of these levels. Factors that must be taken into account are, for example, the de-
sired ‘richness’ of the baseline results provided by the models, the variety of types of models 
(bottom-up or top-down approach), the type of baseline variables (exogenous or endogenous), 
and the available amount of time and budget. Figure 3.1 shows various possible levels of har-
monisation. The lowest level of harmonisation concerns the harmonisation of qualitative as-
sumptions based on a scenario storyline. The highest level of harmonisation refers to the har-
monisation of quantitative assumptions on variables such as GDP, population, international en-
ergy prices, etc. combined with harmonisation of input data on technologies. For CASCADE 
MINTS a moderate level of harmonisation is chosen. This means that only a small number of 
quantitative assumptions (key economic parameters) will be harmonised, whereas technology-
specific assumptions will not be harmonised. This level of harmonisation brings the baseline re-
sults of the various models more into line, while preserving the ‘richness’ of the baseline results 
due to the different modelling approaches and model structures. Before discussing the initial 
conditions that are to be harmonised in the CASCADE MINTS project, the choice of baseline 
scenario will be outlined first in the next section. 
 
 Qualitative assumptions based 
on storyline 
Low 
High 
Quantitative assumptions 
(GDP, population, etc.) 
Technology data 
Model methodology
Cascade
Mints
 
 
Figure 3.1 Level of harmonisation of initial conditions in CASCADE MINTS 
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3.2 Choice of baseline scenario 
As a starting point for the development of a baseline scenario, the IPCC/SRES ‘B2 marker sce-
nario’ has been chosen, which is derived from the Special Report on Emission Scenarios by the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2000). This B2 marker scenario represents 
a group of scenarios that have similar characteristics and fit within the same qualitative storyline 
(B2). This scenario is used in CASCADE MINTS to provide a common and consistent basis for 
harmonisation of initial conditions in the baseline scenario. The objective of this project is not 
to reproduce the outputs provided by the models for the B2 scenario in IPCC (2000) by a differ-
ent set of models. Because the harmonisation is only done for a minimum set of initial condi-
tions and not for all assumptions used by the models, each model defines and uses its own base-
line scenario. Therefore, the set of baselines used in CASCADE MINTS is probably broader 
than the B2 group of scenarios but the added value of these variations is that they reflect uncer-
tainty about future developments. Moreover, the diversity of the models will provide different 
views on the effectiveness of the policy approaches. 
 
Regarding the timescale (up to 2100) and geographical scale (global), the four IPCC/SRES sce-
narios are suitable as a baseline for CASCADE MINTS. All four storylines, i.e. A1, A2, B1 and 
B2, represent different directions of future developments and are considered equally plausible. 
They only cover gradual changes in these different directions and do not include ‘catastrophic 
futures’ or ‘surprises’. Although none of them can be treated as a ‘business as usual’ scenario, 
they can be considered relatively ‘neutral’ in terms of policy assumptions. They do not include 
explicit climate change or renewable energy policies. The storylines of these scenarios can be 
used to develop and evaluate policies by assuming additional policies and measures, which also 
makes them suitable as baseline scenarios for CASCADE MINTS. 
 
From these four scenarios, the B2 scenario is chosen as a baseline scenario for CASCADE 
MINTS because this scenario shows more gradual changes and less extreme developments than 
the other three scenarios in all respects, including geopolitics, demographics, productivity 
growth, and technological dynamics. The other three scenarios may show moderate develop-
ments as well for some of the characteristics mentioned above, but in general they are more ‘ex-
treme’ than B2, assuming, for example, ‘low’ or ‘(very) high’ economic and population growth 
rates, or technological improvement rates. In this respect, the B2 scenario can be considered the 
closest approximation to a ‘dynamics as usual’ scenario. 
 
Figure 3.2 shows the four scenario families and their general characteristics, categorised accord-
ing to two dimensions, i.e. a global-regional and an economic-environmental orientation. More 
details on the storylines and quantitative characteristics of the scenarios can be found in IPCC 
(2000). 
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Figure 3.2 Four IPCC/SRES scenario families and their general characteristics (IPCC, 2000) 
Economic 
A1 
• Very rapid economic growth 
• Low population growth 
• Rapid introduction of new and more 
efficient technologies 
• Convergence among regions 
• Capacity building 
• Increased cultural and social interactions 
• Reduced regional differences in per capita 
income 
 
A2 
• Very heterogeneous world  
• Economic development primarily 
regionally oriented 
• High population growth 
• Self-reliance and preservation of local 
identities 
• Per capita economic growth and 
technological change more fragmented 
and slower than in other storylines 
Global 
B1 
• Convergent world 
• Low population growth 
• Changes in economic structures toward a 
service & information economy 
• Reductions in material intensity 
• Introduction of clean and resource-efficient 
technologies 
• Global solutions to economic, social 
environmental sustainability 
• Improved equity 
 
Regional 
B2 
• Intermediate levels of economic 
development 
• Moderate population growth 
• Emphasis on local solutions to economic, 
social, and environmental sustainability 
• Less rapid and more diverse technological 
change (compared to B1 and A1) 
• Environmental protection and social 
equity, focusing on local and regional 
levels. 
Environmental 
 
Two important features of the B2 storyline are the high priority given to environmental issues 
and the trend toward local self-reliance and stronger communities. These characteristics are not 
explicitly harmonised in the models used for CASCADE MINTS. The reason for this is that the 
B2 scenario is only used as a common and consistent basis for harmonisation of initial condi-
tions and not to achieve complete reproduction of the outputs for the B2 scenario as described in 
IPCC (2000). However, some of the models may have incorporated storyline characteristics of 
the B2 scenario in other assumptions apart from the minimum set of assumptions to be harmo-
nised within CASCADE MINTS, which will be discussed in the next section. 
 
3.3 Initial conditions to be harmonised 
The harmonisation of initial conditions is restricted to a number of key parameters, assuming 
differences in other input variables reflect the uncertainties present or specific local conditions. 
The variables to be harmonised may be either endogenous or exogenous, depending on the type 
of model. Only those parameters that are exogenous in the models have to be harmonised.  
 
ECN-C--04-094  23 
  
The minimum set of initial conditions that must be harmonised, if exogenous, consists of the 
following variables3: 
• GDP 
• Population 
• Energy prices (oil and optionally coal) 
• Overall discount rate 
• Policy. 
 
For GDP and population, the harmonisation is based on quantitative information from the 
IPCC/SRES B2 marker scenario. More details on the assumptions for GDP and population will 
be presented in Section 3.4. 
 
Assumptions for energy prices of oil and, in some models, coal only concern the international 
oil and coal prices. The prices of natural gas are not to be harmonised since they are regional, 
they may be determined endogenously and/or they may be coupled to the oil prices. The oil and 
coal prices that are used for harmonisation are based on results of the POLES model since the 
B2 marker scenario did not provide information on international market prices (only on mar-
ginal costs). The assumptions on international oil and coal prices will be presented in Section 
3.5. 
 
The overall discount rate denotes the rate used for discounting future investments and prices to 
the reference year 2000. The overall discount rate has been derived from the discount rates that 
are currently used in the participating models. Based on this information, a value of 5% has 
been chosen for the overall discount rate. 
 
The harmonisation of policy assumptions is one of the most difficult tasks, since policy schemes 
may be very complex and they may vary substantially among countries and regions included in 
the models. The general guidelines for harmonisation of policy assumptions in the baseline sce-
nario are described in Section 3.6. This section also presents the assumptions for specific policy 
fields that are to be harmonised. 
 
3.4 GDP and population 
For the harmonisation of GDP and population quantitative information from the IPCC/SRES B2 
marker scenario is used. IPCC (2000) provides information about the development of GDP and 
population on global level as well as for different regions. Modelling teams use the assumptions 
on GDP and population for the regions that are included in their models and, if necessary, they 
make their own assumptions for sub-regions in accordance with the assumptions on regional 
level. Here, only the assumptions for world region (based on GMM) and Europe (based on 
MARKAL) are presented since CASCADE MINTS focuses on these regions. Figure 3.3 shows 
the assumptions for the world and European population for the period 2000-2050. The average 
annual growth rate of the world population is ca. 0.9%, whereas the population of Europe re-
mains almost constant until 2050. 
 
                                                 
3  Given the differences in sectoral and/or regional aggregation and different nesting assumptions in the models, 
harmonisation of substitution elasticities in CGE models is not feasible. A similar remark applies to the harmoni-
sation of final energy demand in bottom-up models. 
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Figure 3.3 Harmonisation of population for world (GMM) and Europe (MARKAL) for 2000-
2050 
 
Figure 3.4 presents the assumptions on world and European GDP in the period 2000-2050. The 
GDP of the European region is expected to grow by ca. 70% in the period 2000-2050 (ca. 1.1% 
per year), whereas the world GDP is projected to almost quadruple in this period, which corre-
sponds to an average annual growth rate of ca. 2.7%. This large difference is mainly due to the 
strong economic growth that is expected in Asia, Latin America, and, to a lesser extent, in East-
ern Europe and the states of the former Soviet Union. 
 
The GDP growth in the figure is defined in terms of Market Exchange Rates (MER), as it is the 
metric used in most of the models involved in the present study. However, some of the models, 
such as PROMETHEUS, use Purchasing Power Parity to define GDP and hence also GDP 
growth. The growth rates in these two metrics differ substantially, as can be seen from Table 
3.1, where we give growth rates for world GDP in both metrics. For further information on the 
use of the two different metrics in energy-economic scenarios see (Gruebler et al., 2004) or 
(Manne and Richels, 2003). 
Table 3.1 World growth rate of GDP, for Market Exchange Rate (MER) and Purchasing 
Power Parity metrics 
 1990-2000 2000-2010 2010-2020 2020-2030 2030-2040 2040-2050 
MER 3.1 3.2 2.8 2.7 2.6 2.5 
PPP 3.1 3.0 2.5 2.3 2.1 2.0 
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Figure 3.4 Harmonisation of GDP for world (GMM) and Europe (MARKAL) for 2000-2050 
 
3.5 Energy prices 
In CASCADE MINTS Part 2, only the international prices of oil and, in certain cases, coal are 
harmonised. The assumptions on these prices are based on results of the POLES model. It 
should be noted that for coal prices, modelling teams do not necessarily have to use the prices 
provided by POLES but their assumptions should be in line with the B2 storyline. The reason 
for this is that coal is regionally available and coal prices may be regionally determined. Figure 
3.5 presents the international oil and coal prices for the period 2000-2030 from POLES. It also 
shows an example, based on MARKAL, of the extrapolation for the international oil price be-
yond 2030. In the POLES model, the coal price for Europe is set equal to the international coal 
price. Figure 3.5 presents an example, based on MARKAL, of a regional coal price for Europe 
that deviates somewhat from the international coal price derived from POLES. 
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Figure 3.5 Oil and coal prices for the world (POLES) and Europe (MARKAL) for 2000-
2030/2050 
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 3.6 Policies 
3.6.1 General guidelines 
For the harmonisation of policies in the baseline scenario, some general guidelines are used. 
First of all, only policies in force or approved on December 31st 2003 may be included in the 
baseline scenario. This means that policies for which the exact implementation is not clear at 
this date should be excluded. The baseline scenario should only contain instrumented policies so 
this implies that policy targets (e.g. EU targets for renewable electricity or biofuels consump-
tion) should be excluded. The reason for this is that it should not be assumed in the baseline 
scenario that such policy targets would, in any case, be achieved. Financial incentives that are 
included in the baseline scenario will be continued up to the year 2012 and then phased out. As-
sumptions on the following specific policy fields will be discussed further in the next sections: 
• Primary energy sources: nuclear energy, oil, natural gas, and coal. 
• End-use of energy carriers: end-use subsidies and taxes, electricity market, renewable elec-
tricity, and biofuels. 
• Emissions: climate change and emission trading, standards and industry-negotiated agree-
ments on emissions and energy-efficiency for vehicles, and sulphur control policies. 
 
3.6.2 Primary energy sources 
Nuclear energy 
The contribution of nuclear energy in electricity generation is an area par excellence where 
policies play a decisive role. The political and public attitude towards electricity from nuclear 
fission differs substantially across the EU Member States. Whereas politicians in a number of 
countries have decided to phase out the use of fission power plants (e.g. Germany, Belgium) 
other countries are intent on maintaining or extending existing capacity (e.g. France, Finland). 
In yet other countries, no policy is formulated.4
 
As becomes clear from a summary by the IEA (IEA, 2001), 8 Members States of the EU15 are 
rejecting nuclear power as an option. However, in terms of nuclear capacity, these countries cor-
respond to only about 30% of total capacity. On the other hand, due to the lack of competitive-
ness, the generating capacity in the UK should also be expected to gradually phase out. Thus, on 
the longer term about 40% of nuclear power generating capacity will be replaced by other op-
tions. Most countries advocating a phase out are planning a gradual replacement ending in 2025. 
 
The proposal for harmonisation of nuclear capacity is to use the data in Table 3.2 as an upper 
bound (maximum installed capacity) for the EU15 region. For the New Member States, a con-
tinued use of nuclear power is likely, and it is therefore proposed to use the current capacity 
level, i.e. 11.9 GW (WEPP, 2003), as upper bound in the baseline scenario (in a policy case in 
which the future of nuclear power will be investigated, these assumptions will be relaxed). For 
the rest of the world, no explicit assumption seems necessary in the base case. 
                                                 
4  Assuming the market situation in the UK proves to be exemplary for the European Union, nuclear can be expected 
to undergo a 'voluntary' phase-out. In the UK, nuclear power plants are expected to remain non-competitive, even 
in comparison to gas-fired power plants (IEA, 2002). 
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Table 3.2 Proposed upper bounds for total capacity of nuclear power plants in the EU15 in 
the baseline scenario (WEPP, 2003) 
Year 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 
and later 
Capacity [GW] 123.9 113.8 103.7 93.5 83.4 73.3 
 
Oil 
No specific policies are given so policies regarding oil are not harmonised. 
 
Natural gas 
Gas market reforms are to be implemented in EU Member States, including the New Member 
States. This influences the market model, and is expected to result in lower gas market prices, 
but if this is indeed the case, and if so to what extent, is uncertain. No specific numbers can be 
deduced from such policy measures. Therefore, modelling teams are free to make their own de-
cisions on the specific translation of current and approved gas market policies in their models. 
 
Coal 
Traditionally, the mining industry has received substantial government support in the European 
Union due to social considerations. Recently, such support schemes have been focussed on the 
reduction of non-competing production capacity in a socially acceptable way. The support is 
provided by the country governments, in particular by France, Germany, Spain, and the United 
Kingdom. For none of these countries the production is truly commercial, resulting in a subsi-
dised production of approximately 85 Mton per annum. Support schemes are partially advocated 
as being useful in security of supply issues. 
 
France is expected to end production by 2005, while Spain and Germany show no intention to 
decrease state support. In the latter two countries, production costs are about three times the 
world market prices. In the UK, a two-year state aid package of up to ca. 160 million Euro in 
place since 2002, in spite of production costs being close to market prices. No proposal has been 
made for the harmonisation of coal policies. Therefore, modelling teams are free to make their 
own decisions on the inclusion of current and approved coal policies. 
 
3.6.3 End-use of energy carriers 
End-use subsidies and taxes 
Most policies regarding the use of energy carriers in the European Union, and indeed in much of 
the rest of the world, are put into concrete form by means of taxes, or tax exemptions. These are 
levied on many levels in the energy system: on primary energy carriers, intermediate energy 
products (such as gasoline) or final energy carriers (like electricity). 
 
The prices of energy carriers in energy system models covering a single country or region, such 
as MARKAL, are generally specified as world market prices, or resulting from costs of tech-
nologies used to extract and/or produce the energy carriers. Taxes and subsidies are mostly ex-
cluded from the description in global models, in part because these models describe composite 
regions, for which it is hard to include the county-specific taxes in a simple way. A secondary 
reason is that a full quantitative review for all taxes and subsidies for all countries in the world 
is not at hand. Therefore, subsidies and taxes are not harmonised in CASCADE MINTS. 
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 Electricity market 
Electricity market reforms are to be implemented in the EU Member States, including the New 
Member States. This influences the market model, and is expected to influence electricity mar-
ket prices. However, as in recent years it has become clear that liberalisation does not necessar-
ily result in lower prices, the effect on electricity market prices is unclear. Some recent devel-
opments have even raised concerns over market failures, leading to proposed policies for secu-
rity of supply. However, no specific numbers can be deduced from these policy measures. 
Therefore, modelling teams are free to make their own decisions on the specific translation of 
current and approved electricity market policies in their models. 
 
Renewable electricity 
Renewable energy appears to be the area where most concrete measures are in place. The EU 
Renewable Electricity Directive has set indicative targets for the share of renewable electricity 
in 2010, and all EU Member States have some type of financial support scheme in place. An in-
ventory of policy measures for renewable electricity can be found in ECN (2003). 
 
Aside from this overview, in the ADMIRE REBUS project a simulation model has been devel-
oped for the European market for renewable electricity production (ECN, 2003). A specific pol-
icy case studied using this model is the case where present national support policies in the EU15 
(such as feed-in tariffs) are continued unmodified up until 2010. These results in approximately 
18% share of renewables in the European gross electricity consumption, compared to a 22% 
target, a finding which is comparable to several other studies. 
 
Given the fact that most policies are implemented via fiscal measures, which are country-
specific and therefore hard to parameterise as a direct effect on prices in an aggregate model, the 
proposal for harmonisation of renewable electricity policies is to use the outcome of the AD-
MIRE-REBUS study with the extrapolation of current policies up until 2010 as lower bounds 
for technologies. The results from this study can be regarded an aggregate representation of the 
effect of the variety of current and approved support policies, and are therefore suitable as lower 
limits for the renewable electricity production in Europe, up until 2010. This would imply the 
bounds as given in Table 3.3 should be implemented in the models5. It should be noted that the 
numbers given are activity levels, which is the logical limitation given that many of the fiscal 
measures are stimulating production, rather than installation of capacity. 
Table 3.3 Activity levels of renewable energy systems from the ADMIRE-REBUS model, under 
the assumption of unchanged policies until 2010 
[GWh] 2000 2005 2010
Biomass 26,773 60,075 99,751
Geothermal electricity 4,303 5,337 5,827
Large Hydro (>10 MW) 265,208 272,585 276,942
Small & Medium Hydro (<10 MW) 38,341 43,596 46,186
Photovoltaics 98 884 1,632
Tidal 580 580 580
Wind, off-shore 108 1,254 3,085
Wind, on-shore 16,812 61,043 108,777
 
From the activity levels capacity levels can be deduced, and the values from the ADMIRE-
REBUS study are given in Table 3.4. As the study primarily calculates activity levels, these ca-
pacities should be considered as indicative levels, rather than actual bounding levels. 
 
                                                 
5  The data can be given in more detail: both in years (annual data) as well as in countries. 
ECN-C--04-094  29 
  
Table 3.4 Capacity level of renewable energy systems from the ADMIRE-REBUS model, under 
the assumption of unchanged policies until 2010 
[MW] 2000 2005 2010
Biomass 4,039 8,749 14,474
Geothermal electricity 756 937 1023
Large Hydro (>10 MW) 85,364 87,946 89,471
Small & Medium Hydro (<10 MW) 9,766 11,158 11,799
Photovoltaics 83 753 1,320
Tidal 255 255 255
Wind, off-shore 35 399 1,062
Wind, on-shore 8,610 28,001 49,143
 
The harmonisation proposal of renewable electricity policy assumes that current incentive poli-
cies will be continued until 2010, but not thereafter. In stead, from 2010 onwards, a generic car-
bon tax of 10 €/tCO2 is introduced for the EU (see Section 1.6.4). It may turn out that after 2010 
electricity production using renewable options is not competitive, but given the activity in 2010, 
a total abandonment of these options is unlikely. In such cases, it is left to the discretion of the 
modelling teams to decide whether bounds should be used from 2010 onwards to simulate con-
sistent behaviour of producers. As the assumption is that explicit investment subsidies are 
phased out after this year, one may assume that from 2010 onwards the commercial viability 
will determine installation of new capacity. 
 
Biofuels 
A particular source of renewable energy is the application of biomass. As a result of the broad 
variety of possible applications for biomass (particularly in the electricity, transport, petro-
chemical sectors), an equally broad range of policy frameworks is relevant for biomass. In a 
current EU-project a list of policies relevant for application of biomass is compiled (VIEWLS, 
2004). From a first inventory of biofuel policies, there appear to be few specific instruments 
aiming at large scale introduction of biofuels. Whenever such instruments are in place, they 
generally take the form of tax exemptions for transport fuels, and hence are not to be included in 
the baseline scenario (in compliance with earlier remarks on taxes as policy instruments). There-
fore, biofuels policies are not harmonised in CASCADE MINTS. 
 
3.6.4 Emissions 
Climate change and emission trading 
The policy assumptions include some expectations regarding climate change policy. Since cli-
mate change policy is considered an important issue and is not treated as a separate policy case 
in Part II of the CASCADE MINTS project, some representation of climate policy/emission 
trading for the region of Europe should be included in the baseline scenario. Therefore we pro-
pose to assume a generic carbon tax of 10 Euro2000/tonne CO2 as from the year 2012 (constant 
value over time). This applies to the region of Europe (including Central and Eastern European 
Countries). 
 
In the US, there are no viable proposals on constraining carbon emissions except for the volun-
tary target reduction rate of carbon intensity announced by the President a few years ago. There-
fore the US baseline will not include any additional climate policies. 
 
For other regions/countries, the Kyoto Protocol status of ratification is used as a reference.6 This 
means that for e.g. Japan and New Zealand, who have ratified/accepted the Kyoto Protocol, cli-
mate policy is also assumed in the baseline scenario. However, for Australia this assumption is 
not made. Canada has ratified and should be with the ratifying countries, when using world 
                                                 
6  See http://unfccc.int/resource/kpstats.pdf (status March 17, 2004). 
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 models. However, mostly Canada is treated as part of the North American region, and cannot be 
separated from the US. 
 
Standards and industry negotiated agreements on emissions and energy-efficiency for 
vehicles 
Standards and industry negotiated agreements that are in force or approved on December 31st 
2003, such as the car industry negotiated agreements on CO2 emissions, are to be included in the 
baseline scenario. This section will discuss the automobile industry negotiated agreements and 
European standards on CO2 and other emissions, and energy-efficiency in further detail. 
 
The associations of European, Japanese and Korean automobile manufacturers, ACEA, JAMA, 
and KAMA respectively, have committed themselves to achieving substantial reductions in CO2 
emissions from passenger cars. The CO2 emission targets, as stated in the Recommendations of 
the European Commission, will be included in the policies that will be harmonised. Table 3.5 
lists the targets for each association. These targets apply to the average of new cars sold by the 
members of the associations in the EU, including vehicles replacing conventional cars and pas-
senger cars not producing CO2 emissions or using alternative fuels. It should be noted that the 
intermediate target ranges for 2003/2004 are indicative. 
 
Individual members of ACEA should place on the market models emitting 120 g/km CO2 or 
less, by the year 2000. For members of JAMA and KAMA, these models should be introduced 
by the earliest possible date after the year 2000. The overall objective of the Community strat-
egy is to attain a CO2 emission target of 120 g/km CO2 on average for newly registered passen-
ger cars by 2005, and at the latest 2010. This objective is to be achieved by these three agree-
ments with the automobile industry, combined with research activities. Fiscal measures regard-
ing passenger cars are to be implemented as well to make cars more CO2 efficient. 
Table 3.5 CO2 emission targets for ACEA, JAMA and KAMA for passenger cars 
 
[g/km CO2] 
Intermediate target 
2003 
Intermediate target 
2004 
Final target 
2008 
Final target 
2009 
ACEA 165-170  140  
JAMA 165-1757   140 
KAMA  165-170  140 
 
In the United States, the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards for passenger cars 
and light trucks were established in 1975 to improve the fuel economy of new vehicles. More 
information on these CAFE standards can be found on the website of the Office of Automotive 
Affairs of the US International Trade Administration.8
 
The European Union has established emission regulations for CO, HC, NOx and PM emissions 
for new light-duty vehicles (cars and light commercial vehicles) and for heavy-duty diesel en-
gines, and diesel and gas engines. More information on these emission regulations can be found 
on the website of Dieselnet.9
 
Sulphur control policies 
The B2 scenario includes implicit sulphur control policies. Only the MESSAGE model includes 
assumptions on these policies. Table 3.6 shows the assumptions on energy-related SO2 emis-
                                                 
7  The Official Journal sets an upper bound for the intermediate target of 170 g/km CO2, whereas monitoring reports 
of the JAMA commitment states an upper bound for the intermediate target of 175 g/km CO2. 
8  www.ita.doc.gov/td/auto/cafe.html 
9  www.dieselnet.com/standards/eu/ld.html (Light-duty Vehicles) and www.dieselnet.com/standards/eu/hd.html 
(Heavy-Duty diesel engines, diesel and gas engines). 
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sions derived from the B2 scenario that may be included in the baseline scenario, for various 
regions. These assumptions are based on results from IIASA (source IPCC (2000)). 
Table 3.6 Assumptions on energy-related SO2 emissions in the B2 scenario (IIASA-B2) 
[MtS] OECD REF ROW ASIA WORLD 
1990 21.48 16.16 5.82 16.02 59.48 
2000 14.37 12.72 8.03 23.47 58.59 
2010 9.08 8.39 6.84 27.50 51.80 
2020 3.09 4.22 6.18 26.39 39.88 
2030 1.85 2.06 5.29 23.66 32.86 
2040 1.40 1.38 3.94 20.47 27.19 
2050 1.06 2.78 3.02 13.73 20.59 
2060 0.86 2.66 2.81 10.43 16.76 
2070 0.70 2.59 2.44 7.79 13.52 
2080 0.68 2.67 2.01 6.74 12.10 
2090 0.72 2.74 1.89 6.60 11.95 
2100 0.67 2.76 1.92 6.13 11.48 
 
3.6.5 Regional assumptions 
Due to large variety of the models and the regions and countries included in them, it will not be 
possible to harmonise on such a detailed level within the CASCADE MINTS project. Therefore, 
only a few general guidelines will be given regarding regional assumptions: 
• EU candidate countries will gradually implement EU policies (completed in 2020). 
• Norway and Switzerland will follow overall trends of EU policies. 
 
In order to realise as much harmonisation of policy assumptions as possible, it is important for 
models dealing with the same region(s) to make sure that their policy assumptions are similar. 
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 4. BASELINE GLOBAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 
4.1 Introduction 
The developments of the energy system of Western Europe, and more in particular of the Euro-
pean Union, cannot be considered independent of global trends. In particular, the success or 
failure of policies aimed at addressing global issues such as increased atmospheric 
CO2 concentration levels, security of supply, and proliferation will be highly dependent on what 
happens in the rest of the world. Therefore, in the case studies performed in the Cascade-Mints 
project, a number of models have been included that address developments in other regions of 
the world. In some cases these models specifically address a separate region, for example in the 
case of the NEMS model, while in other cases the models describe a regionalised version of the 
world, as was described in Chapter 2. 
 
Below, an overview of the outcome of various models under baseline conditions will be given. 
First, a number of global trends will be discussed, that may serve as a background against which 
the developments of the European Union may be gauged. For the most striking results, the de-
velopments in the North American energy system will be reviewed. In particular, some issues of 
interest such as the development of carbon intensity and security of supply will be addressed. 
 
In the discussion below, the PROMETHEUS models stands out, and will not be directly in-
cluded in the various discussions. The model provides the only stochastic description, which 
makes it particularly suited for addressing issues where chance plays an important role, such as 
the likelihood that a certain event (such as a 100% increase in CO2 concentration) will occur. 
 
4.2 World primary energy 
The total primary energy consumption to a large extent is determined by the driving forces that 
were subject to harmonization of the baseline assumptions. However, as the various models of-
fer different descriptions of the world, the levels will differ, in some cases substantially. Instead 
of viewing the different outcomes as a handicap for consistent analysis and robust conclusions, 
it should be thought of as a bonus, because the different descriptions reflect different views in 
the way in which the world could develop, even if basic economic developments and energy 
policy parameter are harmonised. 
 
4.2.1 Primary energy consumption more than doubles 
The different projections are shown in Figure 4.1 for five world models. There are clear simi-
larities in the outcomes of four of the models, as they project a steady growth leading to a more 
than doubling of primary energy consumption in 2050 compared to the 2000 level. The lower 
level of one of these five models (DNE21+) can largely be explained by the exclusion of non-
marketed energy use (biomass) by the model. Similarly, the difference between the results pre-
sented here and those of the SRES study (SRES, 2000) can be largely explained by the way in 
which contributions from renewable and nuclear energy sources are accounted for. In the SRES 
results a direct equivalence methodology was used, according to which the primary energy use 
was equalized to the input for these sources. In the present study, these renewable and nuclear 
energy sources are accounted for using substitution equivalents, by introducing efficiency fac-
tors of 3 for electricity generation. 
 
Although the trends in most models are similar, the final outcomes differ substantially as the 
growth rate in the models show large variations. The average annual growth rates of the three 
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bottom-up energy system models vary between a little under 1.7% per annum to over 1.9% per 
annum. These differences are a reflection of the different dynamics in each of the models, and 
can be regarded as indicative for the impact of uncertainties in the future energy system. 
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Figure 4.1 Total global primary energy consumption for the various models 
In Figure 4.1, the model outcomes for PACE differ substantially from those of the other bottom-
up energy system models. The main reason is that PACE, in the version used for the current 
simulation exercise, does not provide an explicit representation of primary energy from renew-
ables and nuclear power. Shifts in primary energy supply away from fossil-fuel based produc-
tion are represented in a top-down fashion by continuous substitution of fossil fuel inputs 
through non-energy inputs, in particular capital. Also, there are some effects from using the 
GTAP database of 1997 as proxy for 2000 economic data. However, a comparison of trends be-
tween the bottom-up models and the top-down model may be still meaningful, although given 
the remark above one should be careful in interpreting differences. From such a comparison, it 
is clear that until 2020 the results of PACE in this way are very similar to that of the other mod-
els, but that from this year onwards the trend as projected by PACE differs substantially, result-
ing in a demand level in 2050 that is almost half as small as the level projected by the other 
models. 
 
4.2.2 Fossil fuels remain dominant 
Policies in general will not primarily be aimed at reducing energy consumption, but rather at 
mitigating the results of energy use, such as increasing CO2-concentrations, or decreasing secu-
rity of supply. Therefore, some policies will have an impact on the mix of energy sources, rather 
than influence the overall primary energy use. From the policy perspective, it thus may be inter-
esting to compare the mix of primary energy sources used. On the global scale, this is illustrated 
in Figure 4.2, where the outcome of various bottom-up models is shown. 
34  ECN-C--04-094 
  
  
0 
200 
400 
600 
800 
1000 
DNE21+ GMM Message Poles 
     [EJ] 
Fossil Nuclear Other Renewable
 
Figure 4.2 Mix of primary energy use in various models, where we distinguish between major 
categories: fossil, nuclear, renewables, and other; in the year 2030 
It is clear that although the overall energy consumption can be of the same order of magnitude, 
the contributions of the various fuel types may differ substantially10. Several factors can con-
tribute to these differences in primary energy demand. 
• As compared to the other models, MESSAGE has a larger contribution from non-fossil fu-
els. This is due to more optimistic assumptions concerning technological improvements and 
deployment of renewable technologies. Another reason is the inclusion in MESSAGE of 
constraints on sulphur emissions (see also Section 3.6.4). 
• The time horizon assumed (2000/2050 or 1990/2100), which is important for models with a 
perfect foresight. 
• The application of endogenous learning or the (exogenous) assumptions on development of 
technology costs. For example in GMM, the learning performance of the fossil technologies 
like IGCC and NGCC is significant in the baseline, therefore the fraction of fossil fuels in 
the primary energy mix is rather high. 
 
This shows that policy measures and RTD support may be of substantial influence, and that the 
future development of use of energy sources may substantially be influenced by policies, some-
thing that will be illustrated for selected topics in due course of this project. 
 
4.2.3 Security of supply will become a world wide issue 
An important issue in the years to come will be the increasing dependence on oil from the Mid-
dle East. In Figure 4.3 we show the percentage of the total world oil production that is produced 
in the region of which the Middle East is part. The regional specification differs between the 
five models shown11, resulting in somewhat different contributions in 2000, ranging from 50% 
                                                 
10  Note that the class ‘other’ in the POLES results includes the renewable options. 
11  As four out of five models aggregate the Middle East with Latin America, we have decided to use a similar aggre-
gation for the fifth model (DNE21+) that does provide separate numbers for the Middle East region. 
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to 58%. Although the five models show a different behaviour of the evolvement of the produc-
tion, in all models the contribution from the Middle East region grows, and becomes substan-
tially larger in most models. This indicates that the world as a whole becomes more and more 
dependent on the resources of one specific region. This raises the question whether under these 
conditions the security of supply can be safeguarded. 
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Figure 4.3 Percentage of the total world oil production that is produced in the region 
encompassing the Middle East 
Some refinements are in place with respect to the regional dependence of oil production. On the 
one hand, the dependence on the Middle East is less severe as one might think at first, as the re-
gions used in Figure 4.3 include some other important oil producing countries. On the other 
hand, the increase in dependence may be stronger than presented in the figure, as the relative 
contribution from the Middle East in the region used for the comparison may grow. For the one 
model, DNE21+, for which we have more detailed information at hand, this is indeed the case, 
as the contribution from the Middle East and North Africa grows from 35% in 2000 to some 
55% in 2030. It decreases again after this period, to a little over forty % in 2050, which is in line 
with the expectation that a steep rise in oil production should in the long run be accompanied by 
a decline, as the overall reserves dictate the possible cumulative production. 
 
Given the recent interest in Security of Supply issues, it is clear that a more detailed analysis of 
the issue would be welcome. Such an analysis should not only encompass a more detailed re-
gional representation of oil production, but would also benefit much from an analysis of trade 
flows. For example, the rise of economies in the Far East, such as India and China at the one 
hand put more pressure on scarce resources, but on the other hand may lead to a more diverse 
import mix for Europe and the USA, as unconventional resources may become more attractive. 
 
The stochastic model PROMETHEUS is particularly suited for analyses of the security of sup-
ply, as it can give insight in the likelihood that this security is disrupted. Under the assumptions 
set out in Chapter 3, the probability that by 2030 the Middle East produces more than half of the 
annual oil consumption is over 85%, as illustrated in Figure 4.4. Stated otherwise, it is quite 
unlikely that the importance of the Middle East in the world oil consumption decreases. 
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Figure 4.4 The probability distribution for the ratio of Middle East oil production to total 
World oil production (mean: 0.59, standard deviation: 0.084) 
 
Given that this (at present) rather unstable region tends to remain dominating in the oil produc-
tion, it comes as no surprise that there is a substantial probability that a sudden price hike in the 
oil price will occur. As can be deduced from the results shown in Figure 4.5, the probability that 
a price hike of more than 15 US$ will occur, is almost 50%. For comparison, our oil price sce-
nario (see Section 3.5) assumes that in the period 2000-2050, the oil prices are in the range of 
4.2 and 6.2 €/GJ, which is equivalent to a range of ca. 26 to 38 US$/barrel12. Considering this 
oil price range, a 15 US$ price hike would mean an increase of ca. 40-60% within a three-year 
period. 
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Figure 4.5 Probability distribution of the maximal increase in oil price in any three-year period 
between 2000 and 2030 (mean: 15.9, standard deviation: 5.904) 
                                                 
12  The energy content of one barrel of oil is 6.12 GJ. 
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4.2.4 Coal production grows faster than oil and gas production 
In Figure 4.6 the world oil production is shown for the five world models considered here. Most 
models show similar trends, in that production continues to grow, although the rate differs. 
Models that project a faster initial growth tend to slow down towards 2050. In general, the oil 
production grows less than primary energy demand. 
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Figure 4.6 World oil production for the various models 
In Figure 4.7 the world production of coal is shown, as calculated using GMM, chosen to repre-
sent the trends in most world models. Of particular importance is that the main growth of pro-
duction takes place in Africa and Asia, as well as in the EEFSU (Eastern Europe and Former 
Soviet Union) region. Moreover, there is a doubling of production from 2000 to 2030 in the 
models under consideration. MESSAGE again provides the exception, due to its sulphur con-
straints. 
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Figure 4.7 World coal production per region, according to GMM 
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 The role of gas will be substantial in the future energy system, even in the present case where 
only limited action is taken to reduce the carbon content of the system.13The different models 
predict different levels of consumption, ranging from a little over 200 EJ up to some 360 EJ, by 
in 2050. The largest deviation is exhibited by DNE21+, and primarily seems due to a later onset 
of gas demand. This notwithstanding, the growth in gas consumption for all models is roughly 
in line with the growth in total energy consumption, i.e. the relative contribution of gas does not 
change significantly on the global scale. 
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Figure 4.8 World gas production for the various models 
For gas consumption, again the stochastic model PROMETHEUS may provide additional in-
sights. For the potential role of gas, its relative price as compared to the oil price is highly rele-
vant. In most models presented here, the gas price remains higher than the oil price. However, in 
principle the chance that the international gas price becomes lower than the international oil 
price is substantial, and an analysis using PROMETHEUS results shows that this chance is ap-
proximately 95%, as can be seen from Figure 4.9. This rather high probability may be due to the 
increasing dependence on oil from the Middle East, noted in Section 4.2.3. If this is indeed the 
underlying reason, the high probability is an indication that Security of Supply is likely to be a 
more severe issue for oil than for gas - which would be furthermore in line with the status of re-
serves. 
 
                                                 
13  Different world models have dealt differently with the 10 €/tCO2 carbon tax in Europe from 2012 onwards, due to 
their differing regional aggregations. Most models have applied it to the (larger) region containing Europe, with 
the exception of MESSAGE, because it would be too strong an assumption to apply it to the complete OECD re-
gion.  
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Figure 4.9 Probability distribution of the ratio of the gas to oil price in 2030 (mean: 0.67, 
standard deviation: 0.17) 
 
4.3 Improvements in energy intensity 
At present, the gross inland consumption of energy per capita shows a large divergence between 
the developed world, most noticeably North America, Japan, and Western Europe, and the de-
veloping countries. A similar statement holds for the distribution of energy intensities over the 
world. In line with the assumptions of the harmonised B2 scenario (see Paragraph 3.4), income 
differences are expected to remain large. On the other hand, the assumption of relatively 
homogenous technological developments over the world induces a converging trend for energy 
intensities. 
 
The representation in Figure 4.10 aims at illustrating these points. The figure shows the growth 
in consumption per capita as a function of the energy intensity14, from GMM, chosen to repre-
sent the trends observed in all models15. In the baseline, reflecting a world where no additional 
action is taken to increase equity, differences remain in the levels of the indicators, but the 
trends are similar. The per capita consumption increases in all regions in the world. At the same 
time, the energy intensities tend to move towards lower values, indicating a more effective use 
of energy for generating GDP worldwide. 
                                                 
14  Energy intensity is defined as (primary) energy consumption over gross domestic product. 
15  Which is only partially the case, as the regional specification may yield different views on the interregional differ-
ences. Particularly, aggregating over all OECD will yield substantially different conclusions. 
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Figure 4.10 Energy intensity as function of the gross energy consumption per capita for the 
various regions in GMM and NEMS (USA). The Other OECD region includes 
Europe. Other models show similar trends for the various regions. 
One should be careful in interpreting effects in energy intensity, in particular on the level of in-
dividual countries. As developing countries industrialize, the use of energy initially increases. In 
particular, a shift from non-marketed to marketed energy will occur, and thus if non-commercial 
energy is excluded from the model the substitution will enhance this effect, leading to even 
higher (and actually non-existing) rises in energy intensity. In later stages of development, the 
decrease as depicted in Figure 4.10 occurs. That such increases are not observed in the figure is 
due to the regional aggregation level, which we use as the interest of the project lays mainly in 
European and regional trends, rather than on the behaviour of individual (developing) countries. 
 
A more speculative conclusion from the figure would be that there appear to be roughly two 
tracks along which economies can evolve. This is even clearer from Figure 4.11, where the en-
ergy intensity is shown as function of the gross domestic product (GDP), on a double logarith-
mic scale. One path seems to be defined by the combination of EEFSU (mainly former Soviet 
Union) and NAME (mainly USA), and is characterized by relatively high GDP, but also high 
energy intensities. The other path is defined by the three other regions, and combines low en-
ergy intensity with relatively low GDP. The improvement in energy intensity seems to be 
roughly independent of the path, except for the region OOECD when the apparent minimal 
value of 5 PJ/G€ is reached. 
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Figure 4.11 Gross inland consumption per unit of GDP as function of the GDP per capita for 
the various regions in GMM, and for the USA according to NEMS. Other models 
show similar trends 
4.4 World final energy and electricity consumption 
In the previous sections, developments in the primary energy consumption were shown. As was 
seen, this may provide insight into a number of global developments and trends, such as 
CO2 emissions and security of supply issues. However, some of the developments will not di-
rectly be reflected in such a parameter; for example, the shift in or towards ‘secondary fuels’, 
such as electricity or hydrogen, will not be captured in an analysis focussing only on primary 
energy use. 
 
4.4.1 Consensus on the growth of final energy demand, but not on the level 
A more appropriate variable for such issues as what shifts in demand may occur, is the final en-
ergy demand. This also provides insight into the sectoral distribution of energy use. The final 
global energy use summed over all sectors in the various models, is shown in Figure 4.12. 
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Figure 4.12 Total final energy consumption for the various world models 
The total final energy use shows only small deviations among models, albeit that DNE21+ starts 
at a lower value. This is due to the fact that non-commercial energy is not included in this 
model. The similarity in result is to be expected, as the final energy demand is driven by vari-
ables that were harmonized, such as the population, GDP and world oil prices. Note that as 
compared to the figures on primary energy use, the PACE model is left out, because this (hy-
brid) model does not provide data on final energy demand. 
 
4.5 World electricity and hydrogen production 
The power sector is expected to play an increasingly important role in the energy systems of the 
world. In the industrialised world, the sector already plays a significant role, and this will in-
creasingly be the case. Moreover, on a global scale growth is expected to be considerable for a 
second reason. As the standards of living in more and more countries is raised to a level compa-
rable to that of the OECD, the energy system will tend to move to become a reflection of the 
present system of the industrialised countries. Both the increasing importance of the power sec-
tor, and the fertile grounds it may provide for policies regarding renewable energy systems, 
make it a sector of prime interest when considering the future developments of the energy sys-
tem. 
 
Aside from electricity, hydrogen could in principle play a significant role in the energy system 
as secondary energy carrier. Its nature as physical energy carrier gives it advantages over elec-
tricity, in particular when storage plays a role. This is the case when supply and demand does 
not match, either temporal or regional, and in mobile applications such as transport. Compared 
to derivatives of primary energy sources (fossil fuels or biomass) it has the advantage that no 
local or global pollution need be caused. For these reasons, the expectations with respect to the 
role of hydrogen in the energy system will be highlighted below. 
 
4.5.1 Electricity increasingly important  
As indicated in the introduction to this section, the power sector will play a significant role in 
the world energy system. As can be seen in Figure 4.13, the world models considered here all 
show very similar trends for the expected growth of energy demand. Certainly, the difference 
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between the various models is maximally around 7% from the average value, both in 2030 
(POLES), and in 2050 (GMM). Such differences are substantially smaller than the difference in 
some other outcomes discussed in the preceding paragraphs, such as the primary energy con-
sumption. This is related to the assumptions on the end-use demands for electricity consuming 
sectors (usually given exogenously in the baseline). Note however that these assumptions have 
not been harmonised in the CASCADE MINTS project, although some models are using the 
same end-use demands as defined for the SRES-B2 scenario. 
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Figure 4.13 Electricity demand in the world models show very similar trends 
At present, there is a large regional variation in the importance of the power sector in satisfying 
the final energy demand. Whereas in the industrialised world (OECD), it currently contributes 
as much as one-fifth of the final energy demand, in the rest of the world its contribution ranges 
between a mere 11 to 13%, as can be seen from Figure 4.14 below. The trends in growth fur-
thermore seem to be roughly the same worldwide, leading to a similar proportion in 2050 be-
tween the OECD-region and the other regions. The levels are substantially higher, with almost 
40% of the demand in the OOECD region being supplied by electricity. 
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Figure 4.14 Contribution of electricity to the final energy demand in the five world regions 
distinguished in GMM, and in the world as a whole 
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 4.5.2 Much uncertainty on the future of renewables and nuclear power 
While there is little controversy over the consumption of electricity, there is huge uncertainty 
over which technologies will be the dominant ones in 2050. Most of the models however seem 
to agree that gas and coal technologies will play a significant role by 2050, with only one 
marked exception16. The agreement is completely lost when considering renewable energy 
sources, where contribution from these sources to the total electricity demand ranges from 10% 
to a quarter, and nuclear power, where it varies between 0-20%. 
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Figure 4.15 Contribution from renewable energy sources (RES), nuclear energy, gas, and coal 
in the power sector as percentage of total electricity generated generally shows 
widely varying trend, reflecting uncertainty on the future electricity system 
Based on the results presented here, both for renewables and for nuclear the results of GMM can 
be used as some average value. We therefore use this model to investigate the role of renew-
ables and nuclear on a more local scale. In Figure 4.16 and Figure 4.17 the regional contribution 
from renewables and nuclear, respectively, are shown for the regions in GMM. A remarkable 
feature for the relative contributions from renewables is that, although the world levels are prac-
tically constant, there are large changes on a local level. Thus, the regional variations serve to 
show that global trends in some cases may be misleading, or at the very least disguise changes 
in the underlying systems. 
 
The changes in the contribution from renewable energy systems (RES) are such that an appar-
ent shift from the LAFM region (Latin America, Africa and Middle East) to the OOECD (EU, 
Japan, Australia, and New Zealand) occurs. In reality such a shift does not exist, as there is no 
relation between the energy systems of the regions that could cause such a shift. In stead, the 
demand for electricity in the LAFM region grows too fast for renewables to keep up with this 
growth, and large hydropower, with limited growth potential, is the dominating renewable op-
tion. For these reasons, the relative contribution of renewables in the power sector is expected to 
diminish. At the same time, the policies in the OOECD region are such that an increased impor-
tance of RES is the result. 
                                                 
16  The exception again being the results from MESSAGE, due to the sulphur policies and the larger role of biomass 
ethanol. 
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Figure 4.16 Contribution from renewable energy sources to the power sector: percentage      
of total electricity generated, for the regions in GMM. 
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Figure 4.17 Contribution from nuclear energy to the power sector: percentage of total 
electricity generated, for the regions in GMM. 
 
4.5.3 Hydrogen plays a modest role, at best 
As mentioned, hydrogen may develop as an alternative to electricity and combustible fuels due 
to its unique character as transportable clean energy vector. However, in a baseline scenario one 
would not expect hydrogen to fulfil its full potential, as the conditions needed for successful 
penetration of hydrogen are absent. Main reason why hydrogen would play a modest role at best 
is that the production costs are high.  
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 Figure 4.18 shows the projected production levels of hydrogen in three world models, currently 
including hydrogen production. The figure confirms the expectations, in that the contribution of 
hydrogen remains relatively small. This holds even in the most promising case, where the con-
tribution amounts to roughly 3% of total demand in 2050, which indeed is modest when com-
pared to for example the contribution of electricity, being of the order of 30%. The figure also 
illustrates that there is a huge uncertainty in the future role of hydrogen, as the production of 
hydrogen differs by orders of magnitude in 2050, for the three models. 
0.01
0.1
1
10
100
2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
[EJ]
Message GMM DNE21+  
 
Figure 4.18 Total production of hydrogen in three world models shows a large variation, both 
in the level and in the time of uptake. Note the logarithmic scale 
Part 1 of the CASCADE MINTS project will be to provide a more extensive and consistent de-
scription of the hydrogen into the models, via the introduction of a more detailed technological 
description. It is expected that such modifications will enable a more extensive analysis of the 
role hydrogen may play in the transition towards a sustainable energy system. From this first 
analysis, we may conclude that there will be some room for hydrogen; in the course of the pro-
ject, this will be up for further investigations. 
 
4.6 Energy-related CO2 emissions 
4.6.1 CO2 emissions are directly related to the primary energy mix 
In this section the results of the MESSAGE, GMM, and DNE21+ models are discussed. The 
POLES model does also provide the required emission results (only up to 2030), but these are 
mostly in line with results from GMM and only discussed separately if they show a different 
trend. 
 
Energy-related CO2 emissions are expected to increase by ca. 65-100% in the period 2000-2030 
(1.7-2.4% per year) and even by ca. 85-170% in the period 2000-2050. This is in line with re-
sults from the PROMETHEUS model indicating a nearly 85% probability that energy related 
CO2 emissions worldwide more than double between 1990 and 2030. Although the primary en-
ergy use projected by MESSAGE is 20% higher than that of DNE21+ in 2050, the CO2 emis-
sions are ca. 25% lower. The level of CO2 emissions of GMM and DNE21+ is similar in 2050, 
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although the primary energy use of GMM is ca. 10% higher. These variations can be explained 
from differences in the primary energy mix. For example, in 2030, the use of non-fossil energy 
sources is almost twice as high in the MESSAGE model, as compared to the GMM model. This 
is amongst others the result of the constraints on sulphur emissions included in MESSAGE, but 
also due to more optimistic assumptions regarding technological improvements. The relatively 
high CO2 emissions in the DNE21+ model are due to a decline of nuclear capacity and its re-
placement mainly by coal. 
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Figure 4.19 Energy-related CO2 emissions on global level; total and power sector only for 
2000-2050 
 
The MESSAGE model is the only model, from which CO2 emission results for the power sector 
are available. On average, the CO2 emissions from the power sector show a similar trend as 
compared to the total energy-related CO2 emissions up to 2030. Beyond 2030, the CO2 emis-
sions from the power sector increase faster than the total CO2 emissions, which results in a dou-
bling of CO2 emissions in the period 2000-2050. 
 
4.6.2 Varying developments for CO2 emission indicators  
Several indicators can be used to gain more insight into the drivers for the development of CO2 
emissions over time. First, the indicator ‘CO2 emissions per capita’ provides insight into the re-
lationship between CO2-emissions and population size. Using this indicator, the development of 
CO2 emissions can be decoupled from population growth. Since the population growth is har-
monised in CASCADE MINTS, CO2 emissions per capita mainly depend on differences in CO2 
emissions.  
 
In 2030, the CO2 emissions per capita are ca. 20-50% higher as compared to the base year 2000. 
Beyond 2020, the models show diverging trends. For MESSAGE, the model with the highest 
share of non-fossil energy sources and the slowest growth of the use of fossil fuels, the level of 
CO2 emissions per capita remains almost constant in the period 2030-2050, about 20% higher 
than the level in 2000. In the case when the use of fossil fuels increases substantially and the use 
of non-fossil energy sources remains reasonably modest, the CO2 emissions per capita increase 
much more, by approximately 70% in the period 2000-2050. The increase of the global level of 
the CO2 emissions per capita is mainly due to a strong increase of this indicator in Eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union. 
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Figure 4.20 Development of CO2 emissions per capita in the period 2000-2050 
The indicator ‘CO2 emissions per unit of GDP’ refers to the CO2 that is emitted for the produc-
tion of one unit of GDP. Figure 4.21 shows that the carbon intensity of GDP is expected to de-
cline over time. Since world GDP is harmonised in CASCADE MINTS, variations between 
models regarding carbon intensity of GDP mainly depend on variations in CO2 emissions and 
differences in regional aggregation. The downward trend in carbon intensity of GDP is due to a 
higher economic growth as compared to the increase of CO2 emissions. The MESSAGE models 
projects the strongest decline i.e. a 50% lower carbon intensity of GDP in 2050 as compared to 
2000, whereas the results of the other models show a decrease of 30% in 50 years’ time. POLES 
projects a relatively strong decline in the first 20 years but reaches the same level of carbon in-
tensity of GDP in 2030 as MESSAGE. The main contributors to the decrease of the global level 
of carbon intensity of GDP are Asia, Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. 
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Figure 4.21 Development of CO2 emissions per unit of GDP in the period 2000-2050 
CO2 emissions are strongly related to primary energy consumption, which is captured in the in-
dicator ‘CO2 emissions per GJ primary energy use’. For example, in case the fuel mix remains 
constant, the CO2 emission per GJ energy consumption would also remain roughly constant, and 
so would the indicator. As can be seen in Figure 4.22, the models considered here show differ-
ent trends for this indicator. Whereas GMM and POLES predict a slow increase of the indicator, 
MESSAGE shows a considerable decline with 30% in the period 2000-2050. The trend dis-
played in MESSAGE is mainly driven by the shift towards CO2 free energy sources (or sources 
low in CO2). The DNE21+ model projects the highest CO2 emissions per GJ, which is due to the 
very small shares of renewable energy sources and nuclear energy in the primary energy mix. 
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Figure 4.22 Development of CO2 emissions per unit of gross inland energy consumption in the 
period 2000-2050 
The indicator ‘CO2 emissions per kWh’ enables more insight into the development of 
CO2 emissions from the power sector, independent of the growth of electricity production. This 
indicator is provided only by MESSAGE. In 2000, this CO2 emission factor is ca. 0.50 kg 
CO2/kWh. Due to the increased use of low-CO2 or CO2 free energy sources for electricity pro-
duction, the CO2 emissions decline by almost 35% up to 0.33 kg CO2/kWh in 2030. In the pe-
riod 2000-2050 the emission factor decreases by almost 50%, up to 0.25 kg CO2/kWh in 2050. 
 
4.7 Other GHG emissions 
None of the models reports separately on the development of N2O emissions. Only MESSAGE 
provides information on the development of (energy-related) CH4 emissions. The growth of 
CH4 shows a similar trend as compared to the CO2 emissions for this model, and so do the total 
GHG emissions. The total CH4 emissions are ca. 77 Mton in 2000, rising to ca. 140 Mton in 
2050. Between 2000 and 2020 the model projects the strongest growth of CH4 emissions. 
 
4.8 NOx emissions 
GMM only provides results on the NOx emissions from the power sector and can therefore not 
be compared to the results from MESSAGE. According to MESSAGE, the NOx emissions de-
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 crease by almost 35% in the period 2000-2050, which is due to the increasing use of cleaner 
primary energy sources that cause no or low NOx emissions. In the power sector, reported upon 
by GMM, the combustion of fossil fuels remains more important, which leads to increasing NOx 
emissions. In 2050, NOx emissions are twice as high as compared to the base year 2000. 
 
4.9 SOx emissions 
For energy-related SOx emissions results are presented for the energy system as a whole (MES-
SAGE) as well as for the power sector individually (GMM). Here, again, results from the two 
models are difficult to compare. MESSAGE shows a strong decreasing trend for total SO2 emis-
sions, i.e. almost a 50% decrease in the period 2000-2050. This is the result of sulphur control 
policies that are included in the MESSAGE baseline. 
 
On the global level, the power sector currently has a share of around 45% in total energy-related 
SO2 emissions. The relatively high SO2 emissions from the power sector and the increasing 
trend over the period 2000-2040 projected by GMM are due to the high share of coal in the en-
ergy mix for electricity generation, i.e. ca. 65% of the fuel input. 
 
 
ECN-C--04-094  51 
  
5. BASELINE OUTLOOK FOR EUROPE 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter on baseline developments in Europe, the following models are considered: 
PRIMES, POLES, MARKAL, NEMESIS, TIMES-EE, PACE and DNE21+. Sometimes the 
European situation will be compared to the US, based on results from the NEMS model. For 
other models results were not available at the time of writing. Moreover, not all models generate 
results at the same level of detail, and therefore most graphs are based on results of a selection 
of models. Most of the models that focus on Europe currently have a time horizon towards 
2030, with the exception of MARKAL, DNE21+ and PACE. For reasons of cross-model com-
parability, the scope of this chapter is limited to the period up until 2030. Since most of the 
models intend to extend their time horizon in the course of the CASCADE MINTS project, 
more extended baseline results will become available later. 
 
The starting point for the analysis is the region Western Europe (WEU) since this is the most 
commonly used region in the models under consideration, as summarised in Table 5.1. Western 
Europe is generally defined as the EU-15, Norway, Switzerland and Iceland. However, there are 
small differences in the definition of this region in the various models. In the PRIMES model, 
the region WEU excludes Iceland. For NEMESIS the WEU region refers to the EU-15 plus 
Norway, while PACE and NEWAGE include Turkey in the WEU region. Differences in region 
definition may partly explain differences in results. Wherever relevant, the PRIMES results for 
the EU30 region, which is defined as Western Europe (excl. Iceland), the 10 new EU Member 
States, Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey, will be taken into account in the discussion of baseline 
results. Some models also distinguish a region ‘Central Europe’ which corresponds to the New 
Member States in this region plus the countries of former Yugoslavia, but excludes the Baltic 
States. It is noteworthy that the regional coverage of most models does not correspond with the 
borders of the European Union. The present EU-25 is covered by only one model - PRIMES. 
This is particularly important when issues related to security of supply are being considered. 
 
Table 5.1 Regional coverage in European models 
 PRIMES POLES MARKAL NEMESIS TIMES- EE PACE NEWAGE-W DNE21+
• EU-15 ?    ?  ? ? 
• Western Europe (WEU)
− EU-15 
− Norway 
− Switzerland 
− Iceland  
? 
excl. 
Iceland 
? ? ? 
excl. 
Switzerland 
Iceland 
? ? 
incl. 
Turkey
? 
incl. Turkey 
? 
incl. Malta
• New EU Member 
States 
?        
• Central Europe: 
− Eastern Europe 
− former YUG 
 ?    ? ?  
• EU25 ?        
• EU30:  
− EU25 
− Norway 
− Switzerland 
− Bulgaria 
− Romania 
− Turkey 
?       ? 
incl 
Croatia, 
Ukraine, 
excl 
Cyprus 
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 5.2 Primary energy consumption in Europe grows less than world energy 
consumption 
As shown in  
Figure 5.1 the primary energy consumption projections of the different models show only a very 
moderate increase, except for PACE and NEMESIS which project a decrease. For NEMESIS 
this decrease can be attributed to the effect of the carbon tax. In addition to the impacts of the 
carbon tax, the decrease in primary energy consumption in PACE can be attributed to the fact 
that PACE only takes into account primary energy consumption from fossil fuels while primary 
energy consumption from nuclear and renewables are not explicitly accounted for. Finally, 
NEWAGE-W shows a trend comparable to most other models, but the absolute value is much 
lower, because only three types of fossil fuels are distinguished, and renewables and nuclear are 
not accounted for. On average, European energy demand is projected to increase by at most 
0.5% per year between 2000 and 2030, whereas world energy consumption grows with some 
1.7% (based on POLES). For the EU-30 the projections are comparable to the trend for Western 
Europe. Energy consumption growth is expected to be slightly higher in the new EU Member 
States than in Western Europe. 
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Figure 5.1 Total primary energy consumption 
5.3 Primary consumption grows less than GDP, but faster than population 
The primary energy intensity relates the total amount of energy used in a region to the GDP. It 
measures the amount of primary energy required to generate one unit of GDP. Changes in this 
indicator reflect both efficiency changes in the transformation sector and at the level of final 
consumers.  
Figure 5.2 illustrates the general expectation that in the next 30 years, the combined effect of 
energy price increases, changes in the sectoral structure of the economy, and technical effi-
ciency improvements indicate that less primary energy is needed to create one unit of GDP. As 
can be seen from the PRIMES results, this effect is stronger in the new Member States. The 
high level of the energy intensity in the base year indicates that there is a lot of room for effi-
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ciency improvements. As is shown by the steep decrease in intensity for this region, this poten-
tial for improvement is to a large extent exploited: while for 2000 the intensity for the NMS re-
gion is roughly three times that of Western Europe, in 2030 the fraction has diminished to ap-
proximately a factor two, and the level is comparable to that of the world as a whole. In the US, 
primary energy intensity is some 30% higher than in Western Europe, and is decreasing at a rate 
similar to Europe; therefore not much change in regional differences is expected in the next two 
decades. 
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Figure 5.2 Primary energy intensity (Gross inland consumption/GDP) compared for Western 
Europe, the new Member States, the US and the world. Other models show similar 
trends 
 
On the other hand, the indicator that compares the growth of primary energy consumption to 
population growth (Figure 5.3) shows an increasing trend. This implies that the energy needs of 
the average European citizen are still increasing steadily. These observations hold not only in 
Western Europe but also in the rest of the world. However, there are large differences in the 
level of this indicator. American residents use approximately twice as much energy as western 
Europeans, and no structural change is expected. On the other hand, in the new Member States, 
energy consumption per capita starts at a lower level, but, according the PRIMES model, shows 
the highest rate of increase. 
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Figure 5.3 Gross inland consumption/capita compared for Western Europe, the new Member 
States, the US and the world. Other models show similar trends 
5.4 Primary consumption is still dominated by fossil fuels 
As illustrated in Figure 5.4, Western Europe’s primary energy consumption in 2000 was domi-
nated by fossil fuels, particularly oil and natural gas, which together accounted for almost two 
thirds of total consumption. 
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Source: Primes. 
 
Figure 5.4 Primary consumption by fuel in Western Europe in the year 2000; total 68,771 PJ 
 
No major change is expected in the baseline scenario. All projections indicate that by 2030, fos-
sil fuels will still have some 70-75% share in the primary energy mix, although models show 
different contributions of the different fossil fuels. Figure 5.5 illustrates the 2030 fuel mix in 
Western Europe as projected by several models. Europe will still primarily rely on oil, but the 
share of natural gas will significantly increase. The growth of gas demand is expected by all 
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models, and analysed further in Section 5.5.4. Oil consumption is expected to stabilise or to de-
crease slightly towards 2030 (MARKAL and DNE21+). Coal consumption is more or less sta-
ble according to Primes and Poles, while MARKAL and DNE21+ project a significant increase 
in 2030 compared to the 2000 level. Not surprisingly, there is hardly any hydrogen in the base-
line, and only beyond 2030. 
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Figure 5.5 Primary energy consumption by fuel in Western Europe in 203017
 
Remarkable is that MARKAL and DNE21+ expect nuclear energy to be phased out in the base-
line, although no explicit phasing out policies have been included (see Section 3.6). This reflects 
that costs for nuclear power are in these models too high to be competitive. Thus, the different 
projections on the share of nuclear in the future energy system reflect some uncertainty on the 
role it may play under present circumstances. 
 
The Primes model projects a 16% share of renewables18, whereas most other models expect 
some 10-12% share in the primary energy mix. Apart from a steady contribution of hydropower, 
wind power shows a significant growth. 
 
Comparing the present fuel mix of primary energy consumption in Western Europe to that in the 
new Member States (Figure 4.3), it is clear that the dominance of fossil fuels is even larger with 
a share of almost 90%. Particularly the share of coal is much larger in new Member States. The 
share of nuclear and renewables is smaller in the new Member States than in Western Europe, 
and the contribution of wind and solar energy is negligible. Of course it should be noted that the 
size of total primary energy consumption in the new Member States is small compared to that in 
Western Europe; 8.4 EJ and 68.8 EJ respectively in the year 2000. 
                                                 
17  Results of the other models could not be included for various reasons. NEMESIS has a time horizon until 2020, 
PACE and NEWAGE-W only distinguish three energy carriers: gas, oil and coal. 
18  Measured according to the substitution principle. If the Eurostat convention was used, the share would be lower. 
56  ECN-C--04-094 
  
  
Gas
19%
Oil/liquids
24% 
Coal/solids 
45% 
Biomass and waste 
3% 
Other renewables 0%   
Other 0%  
Hydro 
2% 
Nuclear 
7% 
 
Source: Primes. 
 
Figure 5.6 Primary consumption by fuel in the new Member States in the year 2000; total 
8,380 PJ 
 
In the next decades the energy system of the New Member States is expected to move towards 
the energy system of the EU15. Consequently, the relative importance of coal will diminish, as 
new, additional generation capacity will be covered mainly by natural gas and renewables. This 
will probably be due to the carbon tax in the baseline scenario. The Primes model projects the 
growth of energy consumption in the new Member States to be slightly higher than that in 
Western Europe after 2010. Given the relatively small size of the energy consumption in the 
new Member States compared to Western Europe, the fuel mix of the EU30 will not be dramati-
cally different from that in Western Europe. The share of fossil fuels is projected to be 70-75%, 
to which coal contributes some 9%. 
 
5.5 Import dependency will increase significantly 
In the year 2000 the import share in primary energy consumption ranges from 35-50% in differ-
ent models. All models project this indicator to increase significantly; 2030 values range from 
50-75% and a further increase is expected towards the year 2050. Differences between these 
import shares may be explained by: 
• Differences in assumptions on the availability of indigenous resources.  
• Timing of use of indigenous sources. 
• Use of renewables in different models. 
• Use of coal, and origin of coal used. 
• A methodological issue: the Primes results show lower import dependency because they do 
not include the effect of imported nuclear fissile material. 
 
In the next sections we will examine the background of these developments for oil and natural 
gas respectively. 
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Figure 5.7 Net imports as share of gross inland consumption 
 
5.5.1 Diversity in the European primary fuel mix relatively constant 
Security of supply is not only reflected in the dependency on imports, although this is an impor-
tant issue. Other factors to be considered are the level of diversification, inversely related to the 
dependence on a few primary fuels, and the correlation between these fuels in terms of costs and 
availability. Several attempts have been made to design indicators that capture these considera-
tions in a compact way. 
 
The Shannon diversity index reflects the variety and the balance in Europe’s portfolio of 
sources for primary energy consumption. 
• Variety refers to the number of fuels available for primary energy consumption. The greater 
the variety of a system, the greater the diversity. 
• Balance refers to the pattern in the spread or the relative importance of each fuel category; 
the more even the spread; the greater the diversity. 
 
In (Jansen et al, 2004) the mathematical definition and elaboration of this index for measuring 
portfolio diversity is given. For this report, it suffices to explain that a decreasing diversity in-
dex is to be interpreted as a situation in which there is an increasing reliance on only a few en-
ergy sources. 
 
The diversity index can be adjusted for the effect of import dependency in the primary fuel mix 
of a given region. The resulting ‘diversity & dependence’ indicator, presented in Figure 5.8, 
combines the information given by the straightforward domestic production share and the Shan-
non diversity index. The decreasing trend shows that for Western Europe, the supply security is 
worsened. However, in the period until 2030 the decrease in indigenous production is partly off-
set by the increased diversification. For Primes, these indicators show comparable trends, al-
though the levels of these indicators are higher, implying less external dependence and more di-
versity. This is mainly due to the higher share of renewables in the Primes baseline, which 
makes diversity showing a slight increase towards 2030. It should be noted that the different 
models show large differences in their projections of Europe’s future fuel mix, see Figure 5.4, 
and thus in their expected level of diversification. Therefore conclusions on these issues can 
hardly be supported from the baseline projections. 
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Figure 5.8 Import dependency and diversity indices in Western Europe 
 
The policy cases in the CASCADE MINTS project will be used to examine the effect of e.g. a 
larger share of renewables to improve the overall supply security, as approximated by this indi-
cator. 
 
5.5.2 Highest dependency for oil - up to 85% 
As shown in the previous sections, Europe’s oil consumption is expected to stabilise at about a 
third of its primary energy consumption in 2030. Domestic production however is expected to 
decrease due to limited reserves and high production costs, thereby introducing a greater reli-
ance on imports from notably the Middle East. Figure 5.9 illustrates how the import share is ex-
pected to increase from 50% to 84% in 2030, as projected by the POLES model for Western and 
Central Europe together. Other models show a similar trend. 
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Figure 5.9 Oil production and imports in Western and Central Europe 
 
5.5.3 Sources of oil imports 
In 1999, 51% of oil imports to the EU-15 came from OPEC countries, of which Saudi Arabia, 
Libya and Iran were largest suppliers. Large non-OPEC suppliers were Norway (21%) and the 
former Soviet Union (18%) (European Union, 2000). As shown in the graph below, the largest 
reserves are in the Middle East. As was seen in Chapter 4, the increased dependency on oil from 
the Middle East one might expect from this build-up of reserves indeed occurs. This may lead to 
increased concerns about the security of supply on the longer term, particularly given the pre-
sent uncertain political situation in that region. 
 
 
 
Source: BP 
 
Figure 5.10 World oil reserves 
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 5.5.4 A dash for gas  
As described in Chapter 4, the world gas consumption is projected to triple between 2000 and 
2050. The gas consumption of Western Europe grows at a slower pace, and different models 
show different growth rates. The growth is largely due to the increased production of natural gas 
for power production (see Section 5.7). The share of Western and Central Europe in the world 
gas consumption is some 22-24%. 
 
5.5.5 The European response to natural gas demand 
The three main natural gas producers within Western Europe are the United Kingdom, the 
Netherlands and Norway, while Russia and Algeria are the main gas suppliers outside Europe. 
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Source: Poles 
 
Figure 5.11 illustrates that in the period towards 2030, domestic gas production is expected to 
decrease slightly, while imports from Russia will grow, thereby increasing the external depend-
ency for natural gas. 
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Figure 5.11 Natural gas production and net imports to Western Europe by region of origin 
 
In line with this, all models project an increase of the external dependence for gas.  
Figure 5.12 shows this for different regions and models, illustrating that other models expect an 
even stronger increase of the import dependency than Poles. Gas supplies from Norway are re-
garded ‘domestic’ in these analyses, implying that import shares for the EU-15 are still higher. 
Nevertheless, Norway is already an established and politically stable supplier, so the actual se-
curity of gas supply is not affected. However, the accession of the new Member States and their 
heavy reliance on a single supplier - Russia - does increase the risks related to gas supply secu-
rity. On the other hand, enlargement is expected to reduce the risks associated with transit of gas 
across the New Member States towards EU-15 countries (Van Oostvoorn et al., 2003). 
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Figure 5.12 Share of imports in gross primary consumption of natural gas in 2030 
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 5.6 Final energy demand in Western Europe grows less than GDP 
Final energy demand in Western Europe grows with on average 0.5-0.8% per year, which is less 
than a third of the growth in world final energy demand. In the new Member States, final de-
mand grows faster, at a rate of 1% per year. There is a significant difference in the projections 
for the EU-30 by Primes and DNE21+. The latter model projects a much more moderate growth 
after 2010. In Primes and MARKAL, final energy demand grows faster than primary consump-
tion. This implies that the transformation sector will become more efficient. 
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Figure 5.13 Final energy demand in different European regions 
 
Final energy demand in Western Europe grows less than GDP, and therefore all models project 
the final energy intensity to decrease with some 1.5% annually on average.  
Figure 5.14 shows that, according to the Primes model, the New Member States start with a 
more energy intensive situation in the year 2000. However, their energy intensity decreases 
faster, at the rate of 2.4%, showing a convergence towards the year 2030. Given the small size 
of the final energy consumption in the new Member States compared to their Western European 
counterparts, the energy intensity for the EU-30 is only slightly higher than that for Western 
Europe. In the US, final energy intensity is almost twice the level of that in Western Europe, 
and decreasing at the same rate. 
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Figure 5.14 Final energy intensity for Western Europe compared to the world, the US and the 
new Member States; other models show similar trends 
5.6.1 No major change in sectoral structure of final demand 
Figure 5.15 illustrates the sectoral composition of final energy demand in the year 2000. The 
transport sector has the largest contribution to the final energy demand, mainly consisting of oil 
products, followed by the industrial sector. This sectoral structure of energy demand is not ex-
pected to change in the period towards 2030, implying that energy demand in the different end-
use sectors shows comparable growth rates. The largest growth in final energy demand is found 
in the commercial sector with 1.1% per year on average, followed by the transport sector with 
0.9% annually, and industry with 0.8% annually. 
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Figure 5.15 Final energy demand in Western Europe by sector in 2000 and 2030; Total: 45.7 
EJ in 2000 and 57.3 EJ in 2030 
 
5.6.2 Final consumption of electricity 
In the year 2000, final electricity demand was approximately 18% of total final demand. As il-
lustrated in, most models expect this share to increase slightly to some 22%; MARKAL and 
DNE21+ providing a lower and an upper estimate respectively. This growth is the continuation 
of a trend that has been visible in the last years, when the growth of the service sector, and an 
increase of disposable income in the residential sector caused an increased penetration of elec-
trical appliances in most European countries. 
 
There are differences in expected growth rates of electricity demand. The MARKAL model pro-
jects a much more moderate growth rate than the others; and NEMESIS and DNE21+ project a 
stabilisation beyond 2010 and 2020 respectively. In the new Member States, demand for elec-
tricity grows relatively fast at an annual rate of 2.2%, compared to a rate of 1.2 – 1.4% annually 
for Western Europe. All models indicate that final demand for electricity increases faster than 
total final energy demand. 
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Figure 5.16 Contribution of electricity to the final energy demand 
The sectoral structure of final electricity demand does not significantly change over time, as il-
lustrated in Figure 5.17 for PRIMES. There are some indications that the electricity demand of 
the commercial sector increases faster than that in other sectors. Other models confirm this pat-
tern. 
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Figure 5.17 Final electricity demand by sector in the EU-30 
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 5.7 Technologies for power generation in Europe 
In Figure 5.18 the composition of the fuels used for electricity production in Western Europe is 
illustrated. Notable is the large share of nuclear, followed by coal. Renewables have a share of 
over 20% in the year 2000, including a significant contribution of large hydropower in Nor-
way19. In the EU-15 this share is somewhat lower (Norway production 113 TWh). 
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Figure 5.18 Net electricity generation by fuel in Western Europe in 2000 (total 2698 TWh) 
 
Expectations on future developments in the fuels and technologies used for power generation 
differ largely among models, as shown in Figure 5.1920. This is due to differences in assump-
tions on the costs and efficiencies of power production technologies and availability of natural 
gas resources. In addition, the future of nuclear power largely depends on nuclear policies, and 
different models deal with this in different ways. It should also be kept in mind that the total 
amount of electricity production differs substantially among models, see Section 5.6.2. 
 
All models project an increase of the share of natural gas, ranging from 16% (TIMES and 
MARKAL), 20% (POLES and DNE21+) to 43% (Primes) in 2030. This variation is mainly due 
to different assumptions on availability and costs of indigenous gas production in Europe. 
Likewise, all models project a decrease of the share of oil and oil products in power generation 
to some 1-3%, compared to 6% in 2000. DNE21+ is the exception with a projected share of 
17%. 
 
The largest range is observed in the prospects for coal technologies and nuclear power produc-
tion. Primes projects coal-based power generation to decrease from the current 25% to some 
15% while the other models expect (considerable) growth in this sector, possibly to compensate 
for the moderate shares of natural gas. The share of nuclear is expected to decrease in all models 
to approximately 20% of the European power generation mix. The exceptions are MARKAL 
and DNE21+, which project a 3-8% share due to high costs of nuclear power. Finally, the pro-
jections for biomass agree in their direction of growth in all models, TIMES and Primes being 
the most optimistic ones. Whenever a distinction between biomass residues and energy crops is 
made, the share of the energy crops is larger. 
 
                                                 
19  Of total hydropower capacity in Western Europe, approximately 21% is installed in Norway (Lako et al., 2003). 
20  Results from NEMESIS are not shown here, because they are only available for 1990-2020; the trend is however 
similar to the one projected by Primes. 
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Figure 5.19 Net electricity generation by fuel in Europe in 2030 
5.8 Energy-related CO2 emissions 
5.8.1 CO2 emissions grow along with primary energy consumption 
 
Figure 5.20 shows the development of energy-related CO2 emissions for the European models, 
except TIMES-EE, since this model only calculates emissions for the power sector. CO2 emis-
sions from the power sector will be discussed later on in this section. On average, the CO2 emis-
sions are ca. 12% higher as compared in 2030 to the base year 2000, for Western Europe. This 
means that, on average, the CO2 emissions grow by approximately 0.4% per year. Beyond 2030, 
growth of CO2 emissions becomes less rapid, and even a decrease is observed between 2040 and 
2050 (based on MARKAL and DNE21+). 
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Figure 5.20 Energy-related CO2 emissions for Europe (WEU/EU-30) for 2000-203021
 
Variations in projected CO2 emissions can partly be clarified from slight differences in primary 
energy consumption, regional aggregations and fuel mix, which also explains the difference in 
the base year 2000. However, for most models for the Western European region, CO2 emissions 
grow at similar rates (9-13%). 
 
NEMESIS is the only model that expects a decline of CO2 emissions i.e. an 8% decrease in CO2 
emissions in the period 2000-2020. In this model, the primary energy consumption is expected 
to decline as well, as a result of the carbon tax (see Section 3.6.4), whereas the other models 
project rising primary energy consumption. In addition to this, coal has a relatively small share 
in the primary energy mix (based on results for 2020). 
 
A comparison of the emission results from PRIMES for the WEU and EU30 region shows that 
CO2 emissions are expected to grow somewhat faster when the new EU Member States and po-
tential future accession countries are included. In the new Member States the CO2 emissions in-
crease less rapidly as compared to Western Europe in the period 2000-2030, 4% and 9%, re-
spectively. In contrast to this result, the DNE21+ model projects a much faster increase for the 
CO2 emissions in the EU30 in the period 2000-2030, partly due to a different regional specifica-
tion. 
 
There is a striking difference with the projections of global energy-related CO2 emissions. Here, 
annual growth rates of ca. 2% per year are observed. This means that in the rest of the world the 
CO2 emissions are expected to rise much more rapid as compared to Western Europe. This also 
means that Europe’s share in global CO2 emissions will decline over time. 
 
Under the Kyoto Protocol, Western Europe is committed to achieving an 8% reduction of CO2 
emissions by 2008-2012, as compared to the level in 1990. For the EU15, Norway, Switzerland, 
and Iceland together, the total emissions of CO2 amounted to approximately 3400 Mton in 
199022. This means that in the period 2008-2012, the level of total CO2 emissions (including 
                                                 
21 The PACE and NEWAGE models are not considered in this section, since these models only takes into account 
the primary energy categories gas, oil/liquids, and coal/solids. 
22  Based on CO2 emission level for individual countries for 1990 derived from ww.climnet.org/resources/kpeng.pdf. 
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non-energy uses) should not exceed a level of approximately 3100 Mton per year. However, 
Figure 5.20 shows that the energy-related CO2 emissions alone are already expected to exceed 
is level, indicating that it will be very difficult to achieve the Kyoto target. 
 
re of coal, as compared to 
RIMES and, to a lesser extent, TIMES-EE (see Paragraph 5.6.2). 
er-
g the projections for total energy-related CO2 emissions and primary energy consumption. 
 
th
5.8.2 Large variety in CO2 emissions projections power sector 
The growth rates for CO2 emissions from the power sector vary much more among the models 
as compared to the total energy-related CO2 emissions, i.e. a 14-32% growth in the period 2000-
2030. This corresponds to an annual increase of 0.4-0.9%, which is faster than the growth rate 
of total energy-related CO2 emissions. MARKAL projects the highest growth of CO2 emissions 
from the power sector, which is due to the higher carbon content of the fuel mix for electricity 
generation, i.e. the smaller share of natural gas and larger sha
P
 
The results from the PRIMES model for the WEU and EU30 region show similar growth rates, 
but the growth rate for the New Member States and potential future accession countries is 
somewhat lower. The declining trend that is observed for NEMESIS is not surprising consid
in
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Figure 5.21 CO2 emissions from the power sector for Europe (WEU/EU-30) for 2000-2030 
 but as of 2040, both MARKAL and DNE21 expect a decline of CO2 emissions per 
apita. 
bsolute value of this indicator is twice as high, or even 
ur times as high as the global average. 
 
5.8.3 Strong decline in carbon intensity of GDP but constant CO2 emissions per GJ 
The results for the CO2 emissions per capita show that this indicator is expected to increase by 
8-17% in the period 2000-2030 for Western Europe, see Figure 5.22. This implies that the CO2 
emissions grow faster than the population in Western Europe. Beyond 2030, this growth will 
continue
c
 
Figure 5.22 also shows results for the CO2 emissions per capita for the new Member States. 
These are expected to grow somewhat faster in the new Member States as compared to Western 
Europe. CO2 emissions per capita for Western Europe are ca. twice as high as compared to the 
range of the global average. For the US, the CO2 emissions per capita increase by similar rates 
as compared to Western Europe, but the a
fo
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Figure 5.22 CO2 emissions per capita for WEU/EU-30/NMS/US for 2000-2030 
For Western Europe the carbon intensity of GDP is expected to decline by 30-45% in the period 
2000-2030. Results from the MARKAL model show that beyond 2030 the carbon intensity of 
GDP decreases even further. Since the CO2 emissions increase over time, the downward trend in 
carbon intensity of GDP is due to a higher economic growth as compared to the increase of CO2 
emissions. The absolute level of the carbon intensity of GDP is in the range 0.21-0.26 tons CO2 
per 1000 Euro in 2030. The global average in the same year is almost twice as high. In 2050, the 
global average will have approached the 2000 level of carbon intensity of GDP in Western 
Europe. 
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Figure 5.23 Carbon intensity of GDP for WEU/EU-30/NMS/US for 2000-2030 
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The new Member States currently have a carbon intensity of GDP of ca. 1.4 ton CO2 per 1000 
Euro (PRIMES). This level is expected to decrease very quickly by ca. 2% per year to a level of 
approximately 0.52 ton CO2 per 1000 Euro in 2030, which is still twice as high as compared to 
Western Europe. In the US, the current carbon intensity of GDP is about 0.54 ton CO2 per 1000 
Euro (NEMS). Since the development of this indicator for the US shows a similar trend as com-
pared to Western Europe, the absolute level of carbon intensity of GDP will remain higher for 
the US on the long term as well. 
 
The carbon intensity of energy use is indicated by the CO2 emissions per GJ. For Western 
Europe, most models show a constant trend or a slight decrease in the period 2000-2030. The 
same conclusion holds for the US. In the new Member States, a decline of 15% is observed. 
Only MARKAL expects a slight increase of CO2 emissions per GJ. The average CO2 emissions 
per GJ are much lower for Western Europe as compared to the levels for the new Member 
States and the US, and the global level. For the EU-30, PRIMES and DNE21 project different 
developments, i.e. a 10-% decrease and a 25-% increase, respectively. 
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Figure 5.24 CO2 emissions per GJ for WEU/EU-30/NMS/US for 2000-2030 
 
The general expectation for Western Europe is that the specific CO2 emissions from the power 
sector will decline in the period 2000-2030, which will mostly be achieved in the first ten years. 
For this indicator most models show a decrease ranging from 10-28% by 2020 as compared to 
the base year 2000, which is continued beyond 2020. Only the MARKAL model shows a differ-
ent trend. After an initial decline of CO2 emissions from the power sector, the model expects the 
emissions to rise again beyond 2010. The relatively high CO2 emissions per kWh are due to the 
very large share of coal and the relatively small shares of gas and nuclear energy in electricity 
generation. In 2000, the absolute level of CO2 emissions per kWh in Western Europe is about 
30% lower as compared to the global average. However, in 2030, this difference no longer ex-
ists. For the new Member States the decrease is much higher as compared to Western Europe in 
the next 25 years, ca. 36% (PRIMES). For the US, the CO2 emissions are expected to decline as 
well, but at a much slower rate, ca. 6% in the next 15 years. 
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Figure 5.25 CO2 emissions per kWh for WEU/EU-30/NMS/US for 2000-2030 
5.8.4 Relatively high increase of CO2 emissions from transport sector 
Figure 5.26 shows the CO2 emissions of final energy use split into end-use sectors for 2030 and 
2050, for the WEU and EU30 region. If the new Member States are included, the share of the 
transport sector is slightly larger in 2030 (PRIMES). The results also show that for Western 
Europe the share of the transport sector in total CO2 emissions is expected to increase mainly at 
the expense of the industrial sector. 
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Figure 5.26 Contributions of end-use sectors to total energy related CO2 emissions for 
Western Europe and EU-30 for 2030 and 2050 
ECN-C--04-094  73 
  
5.9 CH4 emission reduction important to mitigating the greenhouse effect 
Among the European models, only MARKAL provides results on the development of other 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions such as CH4 and N2O. Figure 5.27 shows the development of 
these emissions in the period 2000-2050, compared to the development of total energy-related 
CO2 emissions and total GHG emissions (which are calculated in Mton CO2 equivalents). The 
CO2 emissions as well as the N2O emissions increase over time. The level of N2O emissions, for 
which the use of fertilisers in agriculture is the principle source, is about 620 kton in 2000. This 
is projected to increase up to ca. 690 kton in 2050. In contrast to this, the development of total 
GHG emissions shows a decreasing trend, which means that the increase of CO2 and N2O emis-
sions is entirely compensated by a decrease in CH4 emissions. The level of CH4 emissions is ca. 
31 Mton per year in 2000. This is expected to decline rather quickly between 2010 and 2020 
towards a level of ca. 19 Mton per year, which remains almost constant as from 2020. This de-
crease is mainly due to reduced methane emissions from disposal sites, as a result of increased 
recovery of methane. Another possibility is to combust the methane, and possibly utilise the 
produced heat. This reduces the methane emissions but produces CO2 emissions, which have a 
less strong greenhouse effect. Figure 5.27 clearly shows the importance of reducing CH4 emis-
sions in mitigating the greenhouse effect. 
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Figure 5.27 Development of total CO2, CH4, N2O and Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions 
(MARKAL) 
 
 
 
 
 
74  ECN-C--04-094 
  
 6. KEY MESSAGES 
6.1 Twelve models use one baseline scenario to provide a comprehensive out-
look on future developments 
This report has presented the results of an effort by ten renowned modelling teams in Europe, 
the US and Japan to provide an outlook to possible developments in Europe and at global level. 
This outlook was based on a common, harmonised baseline scenario, and will serve as a 
benchmark against which policy scenarios will be compared in later stages of the project. 
 
Given the diversity of the models, a moderate level of harmonisation was chosen. A number of 
quantitative assumptions – economic and demographic developments, oil prices and current 
policies – have been harmonised, whereas technology-specific assumptions have not been har-
monised. A consistent basis for harmonisation of a baseline scenario was provided by the SRES 
‘B2 marker scenario’ (IPCC, 2000). The B2 scenario shows more gradual changes and less ex-
treme developments than other SRES scenarios and can be considered the closest approximation 
to a ‘dynamics as usual’ scenario, with moderate GDP and population growth. 
 
Because other important driving forces, such as technological change and average improvement 
of energy efficiency, were not harmonised, the set of baseline results from CASCADE MINTS 
is broader than the B2 group of scenarios. The added value of these variations is that they reflect 
uncertainty about future developments. Moreover, the diversity of the models will provide dif-
ferent views on the effectiveness of the policy approaches. It should be noted that all observa-
tions fall within the boundaries of the harmonised baseline. The main driving forces - GDP, 
population and energy prices - have been harmonised, and conclusions that directly rely on im-
plications of these assumptions are beyond the scope of the project. 
 
Notwithstanding the fact that the baseline scenario provides a starting point for further analyses 
in the CASCADE MINTS Part 2 project, the results of this modelling work, based on a scien-
tific consensus among modellers, already provide a first image of a future world under moderate 
GDP and population growth, thereby giving first answers to questions such as: 
• What are the challenges and weaknesses of current energy supply in Europe, and in the rest 
of the world? 
• In what sense do Europe’s energy supply and consumption differ from other world regions? 
• Are current policies sufficient for achieving set targets? 
• What are the perspectives regarding global warming? 
 
The timing of this policy research is appropriate, as the European Commission has started a re-
flection on the actions on climate change for the post-2012 period, especially considering the 
benefits and costs and taking into account both environmental and competitiveness concerns. 
 
In the next sections an overview is given of the key messages derived from the CASCADE 
MINTS Part 2 baseline scenario.  
 
6.2 World energy trends until 2050 
Primary consumption more than doubles 
• World primary energy consumption is expected to more than double in 2000-2050, in line 
with the assumptions regarding moderate economic and population growth. Asia is the fast-
est grower and quadruples its energy consumption in 2050. 
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• Fossil fuels are expected to remain dominant in the world fuel mix by supplying 65-80% of 
primary energy use. Combined with the growth in primary energy use, this results in an ever 
increasing speed of depletion of natural resources. 
• The worldwide production of coal grows faster than oil and gas production. The main 
growth of coal production takes place in Africa and Asia, as well as in the Eastern Europe 
and Former Soviet Union region. 
• The growth in gas consumption is roughly in line with the growth in total energy consump-
tion, i.e. the relative contribution of gas does not change significantly on the global scale. 
 
Regional differences remain large 
• At present, the gross inland consumption of energy per capita shows a large divergence be-
tween the industrialised world, North America, Japan, and Western Europe on the one hand, 
and the developing countries on the other hand. Although the per capita consumption in-
creases in all regions in the world, the differences remain large, which is a reflection of our 
assumption that no additional action is taken to increase equity. 
• The present distribution of primary energy intensities, the indicator measuring the average 
amount of energy needed for the production of one unit GDP, shows a large dichotomy be-
tween the developed countries and the developing countries. Energy intensities improve in 
all regions and their levels converge. This is for a large part the result of the global trend 
towards increased efficiency in energy consumption. In the developing countries, such im-
provements may temporarily be offset by the shift from un-marketed energy towards com-
mercial energy, which occurs due to industrialization. 
 
Electricity increasingly important  
• The importance of electricity in satisfying the final energy demand increases in all world 
regions, leading to an average global contribution of 32% electricity in final energy demand 
in 2050. However, the present large regional variations, ranging from some 12% in the de-
veloping world to 20% in the industrialised world, tends to remain, as the trends in growth 
seem to be roughly the same world-wide. 
• While there is little controversy over the increase in consumption of electricity, there is 
huge uncertainty over which technologies will be dominant in 2050. Most of the models 
however seem to agree that gas and coal technologies will play a significant role by 2050. 
The agreement is completely lost when considering renewable energy sources, where con-
tribution from these sources to the total electricity demand ranges from 10% to a quarter, 
and nuclear power, where it varies between 0-20%. 
 
Hydrogen plays a modest role, at best 
• Hydrogen may develop as an alternative to electricity and combustible fuels due to its 
unique character as transportable clean energy vector. However, in a baseline scenario, the 
conditions needed for successful penetration of hydrogen are absent, and therefore the con-
tribution of hydrogen remains relatively small. There is a huge uncertainty in the future role 
of hydrogen, as the production of hydrogen differs by orders of magnitude in 2050 among 
models. 
 
6.3 Europe in a global context 
Europe in 2030 - what can we expect? 
• In Europe, the primary energy consumption increases by some 20% in 2000-2030, which is 
a much slower growth than the world average. The reliance on fossil fuels, with a 70-75% 
contribution to the primary energy mix, is comparable to the rest of the world. Europe’s 
consumption of natural gas is expected to increase significantly, largely due to the increased 
use of natural gas for power production. 
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 • Less consensus exists on the prospects of oil, coal and nuclear energy. The expectations on 
consumption of oil vary from stable to a slight decrease. The perspectives of solid fuels and 
nuclear energy mainly depend on the development of the European fuel mix for power gen-
eration. Coal consumption is expected to stabilise or grow. Some models expect nuclear en-
ergy to be phased out in the baseline, although no explicit phasing out policies have been 
included. This reflects that these models assume higher costs for nuclear power. 
• Europe’s 10 New Member States presently have a 45% share of coal in their primary fuel 
mix, a great deal larger than in their Western European counterparts. This is balanced by a 
much smaller share of nuclear and renewables. In the next decades the energy system of the 
New Member States is expected to move towards the energy system of the EU-15. Conse-
quently, the relative importance of coal will diminish, as new, additional generation capac-
ity will be covered mainly by natural gas and renewables. 
 
Europe uses a lot of energy but does so efficiently 
• Energy intensities can be used for comparing Europe’s energy consumption to that in the 
rest of the world. European residents use 2,3 times as much energy as the world average, 
and the energy consumption per capita shows an increasing trend, implying that the energy 
needs of the average European citizen are still increasing steadily. American residents use 
approximately twice as much energy as western Europeans, and no structural change is ex-
pected. On the other hand, in the New Member States, energy consumption per capita starts 
at a lower level but shows the highest rate of increase. 
• Europe’s energy intensity, measured as the amount of primary energy required to generate 
one unit of GDP, is among the lowest in the world. An exception is the situation in Europe’s 
10 New Member States. The high level of the energy intensity in the base year indicates that 
there is a lot of room for efficiency improvements. A steep decrease in intensity for this re-
gion shows that this potential for improvement is to a large extent exploited: while for 2000 
the intensity for the New Member States region is roughly three times that of Western 
Europe, in 2030 the fraction has diminished to approximately a factor two, and the level is 
comparable to that of the world as a whole. 
 
6.4 Challenge: Security of supply 
Security of Supply will become a worldwide issue 
• Recognising the continuing global reliance on fossil fuels, an important issue in the years to 
come will be the increasing dependence on oil from the Middle East. Although the models 
show different projections of the evolvement of oil production, in all models the contribu-
tion from the Middle East region grows, and becomes substantially larger. This is confirmed 
by the results of a stochastic model yielding a more than 85% probability that by 2030 the 
Middle East produces more than half of the annual oil consumption. This indicates that the 
world as a whole becomes more and more dependent on the resources of one specific re-
gion. 
• Given that this (at present) rather unstable region tends to remain dominating in the oil pro-
duction, it comes as no surprise that there is a substantial probability of sudden increases in 
the oil price of some 40-60%. Also, one of the models suggests that Security of Supply is 
likely to be a more severe issue for oil than for gas - which would be in line with the status 
of reserves. 
 
Europe’s import dependency will increase significantly 
• For Europe, the observations made for the world have significant implications. Europe’s 
dependence on oil from the Middle East is expected to increase up to 85%. If other world 
regions also increasingly rely on oil from this region, this may indeed lead to further oil 
price increases, which will particularly affect the transport sector. 
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• For natural gas, external dependency will also grow in the next decades. A continuing 
growth in gas consumption combined with a decrease of gas production in the UK, the 
Netherlands and Norway, will lead to a higher share of imports from the two main suppliers 
Russia and Algeria. Additionally, the accession of the new Member States and their heavy 
reliance on supplies from Russia increases the risks related to gas supply security. On the 
other hand, enlargement is expected to reduce the risks associated with transit of gas across 
the New Member States towards EU-15 countries. 
• There is another dimension to security of supply than dependency on imported fuels. The 
level of diversification, inversely related to the dependence on a few primary fuels, and the 
correlation between these fuels in terms of costs and availability may further influence the 
sensitivity of Europe to fuel supply disruptions. Preliminary analysis of these issues indi-
cates that an increase in diversification – for instance a growing contribution from renew-
ables – may alleviate the increase in external dependence for oil and gas. It should be noted 
however that the models show large differences in their projections of Europe’s future fuel 
mix, and thus in the expected level of diversification. 
 
6.5 Challenge: Climate change 
Global CO2 emissions to double until 2030 
• It is likely that global warming is attributable to human activities, in particular to emissions 
of greenhouse gases, including emissions of CO2. All models project a continuing growth of 
these emissions. Overall, the CO2 emissions in 2030 are expected to be approximately twice 
the level of 1990, the base year of the Kyoto protocol. The largest growth of these emissions 
is expected to occur in the developing world, in particular Asia. 
• There is a large variation in emissions projections between models, related to the differ-
ences in the primary energy mix, particularly the share of fossil fuels. This illustrates the 
uncertainty of developments within the boundaries of the harmonised baseline scenario. 
• The carbon intensity of the world economy is projected to decrease with 30-50%. The main 
contributors to this decrease are Asia, Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, where 
the growth in emissions is compensated with a higher GDP growth. The region encompass-
ing Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union remains the most carbon intensive one. 
 
Western Europe will have severe difficulties complying to the Kyoto protocol 
• Although CO2 emissions in Western Europe show moderate growth as compared to the 
global trend, it is not on track towards the target agreed under the Kyoto Protocol. Western 
Europe is committed to achieving an 8% reduction of CO2 emissions by 2008-2012, as 
compared to the level in 1990. This means that in this period, the level of total CO2 emis-
sions (including non-energy uses) in Western Europe should not exceed approximately 
3100 Mton per year. However, all models indicate that the energy-related CO2 emissions 
alone are already expected to exceed this level. Therefore additional instruments to those in 
place by the end of 2003, such as emissions trading with regions outside Annex 1 Europe, 
based on the JI and CDM instruments, will have to play a key role in meeting Kyoto com-
mitments. 
• Beyond 2012, assuming that some type of climate policy is in place in Europe, reflected in a 
moderate carbon tax of 10 euro/ton CO2, emissions are expected to continue their growth 
with ca. 0.4% per year. 
• CH4 emissions reductions might become important in mitigating the enhanced greenhouse 
effect. According to one of the models, the increase in emissions of CO2, N2O, is compen-
sated by a decrease in CH4 emissions. As a consequence, the overall development of green-
house gas emissions (in Mton CO2 equivalents), also shows a decrease. The decline in CH4 
emissions is mainly due to reduced methane emissions from disposal sites, as a result of in-
creased recovery of methane. Another possibility is to combust the methane, and possibly 
utilise the produced heat. This reduces the methane emissions but produces CO2 emissions, 
which have a less strong greenhouse effect. 
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6.6 Strategies and directions 
The analysis presented in this report has identified some major challenges that the world is fac-
ing today. The findings are in line with the Commission WETO report23 and the IEA World En-
ergy Outlook 2004 (IEA, 2004). In the next phases of the CASCADE MINTS Part 2 project, 
several strategies will be explored that may help to counter these developments. These strategies 
rely on technologies based on renewable energy, nuclear power, CO2 capture and storage, and 
hydrogen. All of these have their own characteristics, costs, advantages and consequences, and 
will be further assessed within the project. 
 
                                                 
23 See http://europa.eu.int/comm/research/energy/gp/gp_pu/article_1257_en.htm 
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 APPENDIX A KEY CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ENERGY MODELS 
Table A.1 Models by type 
Model     System
boundaries 
 Top-down/ 
bottom-up 
Endogenous 
technology 
learning 
Objective Type Distinguishing features
Global models, US, Canada 
AIM 
Asian Pacific 
Integrated Model  
Macro 
economic 
Top-down   The AIM model assesses policy 
options for reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions and avoiding impacts of 
climate change, particularly in the 
Asia-Pacific region. It can also be 
used for analysis at the global level. 
A recursive dynamic equilibrium 
model of the world economy. 
• Family of models. 
DNE 21+  
Dynamic New Earth 
21+ 
Energy 
sector 
Bottom-up  No, exogenous The model seeks the trajectory of 
optimal global energy systems to 
mitigate global warming. 
Global energy systems model, bottom-
up type, dynamic optimisation.  
DNE21+ has a simple relationship 
between the energy price and the 
demand using the long term price 
elasticity. 
• 77-Region world model. 
• Time horizon is 2000 to 2100. 
ETP  
Energy Technology 
Perspectives 
Energy 
sector 
Bottom-up  (under
development) 
Supporting the development of WEO 
2004 alternative Policy Scenario 
(which will be a global scenario). 
Dynamic Energy System 
Optimisation. 
• Global 15-regional MARKAL-model. 
• Time horizon: 2050. 
• Linked to IEA WEO scenarios. 
GMM  
Global Markal Macro 
Energy sector Bottom-up  Yes To provide a broad platform for 
analysis of technological progress 
and related policy insights. 
A dynamic linear programming 
‘bottom-up’ model. Technology-
oriented model allowing a rich 
representation of both supply and 
demand technologies.  
• Multi-regional model. 
• Partial equilibrium (MARKAL-ED) 
using elastic demands. 
• Time horizon 2000-2050. 
MAPLE (Canada) Energy sector Bottom-up Yes To undertake analysis of technology, 
environmental issues and regulations 
related to energy policies. 
Energy-economy equilibrium with 
imperfect foresight. Each market is 
modelled according to the way 
consumers make decisions, e.g., 
refinery and utility markets are energy 
• MAPLE is a technology-rich model 
which solves annually for energy 
economy equilibrium.  
• The baseline assumes current 
regulations and policies extend into 
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Model System 
boundaries 
Top-down/ 
bottom-up 
Endogenous 
technology 
learning 
Objective Type Distinguishing features 
cost minimizers while residential car 
choices are based on multiple 
attributes (logit functions). It is 
derived from the US model NEMS. 
the future; continual progress is 
assumed in the menu of technologies 
available for future choices based on 
historical trend. Actual progress is 
determined endogenously through 
consumer choices and endogenous 
technology improvements. 
MESSAGE 
Model for Energy 
Supply Strategy 
Alternatives and their 
General 
Environmental Impact
Energy sector Bottom-up Yes (optional) Medium- to long-term energy system 
planning, energy policy analysis, and 
scenario development. 
Dynamic systems-engineering 
optimisation model. The model 
provides a framework to represent an 
energy system with all its flows and 
dependencies. It can be used to 
compute a least cost solution based on 
exogenous energy demand. 
• Technology-rich model with a time 
frame of 1990-2100. 
• All technologies in the energy system 
are associated with a number of 
characteristics such as energy inputs 
and outputs, capital and operational 
costs, facility lifetimes, emissions of 
various types per unit activity, 
maximum possible penetration rates 
and start year. 
• Technological change is represented 
in two ways: either exogenously in 
the form of predefined learning rates 
for different technologies over time 
as well as endogenously, where costs 
are reduced as a function of 
increasing cumulative capacities. 
NEMS (US) 
National Energy 
Modeling System 
Energy sector Bottom-up Yes (for 
electric power 
technologies 
and all other 
relatively new 
infant 
technologies in 
the building 
sector) 
To develop Annual Energy Outlook 
and to do analysis of technology, 
environmental or regulatory energy 
policies. 
 
 
Energy-economy equilibrium with 
imperfect foresight. Each market is 
modelled according to the way 
consumers make decisions, e.g., 
refinery and utility markets are energy 
cost minimizers while residential car 
choices are based on multiple 
attributes (logit functions). 
• NEMS is a technology-rich model 
which solves annually for energy 
economy equilibrium.  
• The baseline assumes current laws, 
regulations and policies extend into 
the future; continual progress is 
assumed in the menu of technologies 
available for future choices based on 
historical trend.  
Actual progress is determined 
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 Model System 
boundaries 
Top-down/ 
bottom-up 
Endogenous 
technology 
learning 
Objective Type Distinguishing features 
endogenously through consumer 
choices and endogenous technology 
improvements. 
NEWAGE-W  
  
Macro
economic 
Top-down No Analysis of the macroeconomic 
effects of climate change policies  
(e.g. CO2 reduction) on a global level. 
Computable General Equilibrium 
Model (CGE) 
• Intertemporal. 
• 33 regions. 
• 4 sectors. 
POLES Energy sector Bottom-up Yes (optional) World energy market model. The 
model structure corresponds to a 
hierarchical system of interconnected 
modules and involves three levels of 
analysis: international energy 
markets, regional energy balances 
and national models on energy 
demand. 
It is a recursive simulation model, in 
which energy markets responds with 
different lag structures to international 
price variations. Behavioural 
equations take into account the price 
effects, techno-economic constraints 
and trends.  
• 38 world regions (being extended to 
46). 
• 15 energy demand sectors. 
• 12 large-scale power generation 
technologies. 
• 12 new and renewable energy 
technologies. 
• Endogenous oil, gas and coal prices. 
PROMETHEUS Energy sector Bottom-up Yes • Provides strategic and analytical 
information on risks and 
probabilities regarding the 
variables incorporated in the 
model or any pre-determined 
function involving them: energy 
supply and demand, emissions, 
international fuel prices, power 
plant capacities, electricity 
generation by plant, reserves for 
oil and gas. 
• Provides stochastic input 
(variances, co-variances) to 
decision tools designed to 
incorporate risks. 
Stochastic • A self-contained energy model 
consisting of a set of stochastic 
equations. 
• All exogenous variables, parameters 
and error terms in the model are 
stochastic with explicit representation 
of their distribution including on 
many cases terms of co-variance. It 
follows that all endogenous variables 
as a result are also stochastic. 
• It contains stochastic relations 
describing technology improvement 
dynamics (both learning by research 
and experience). 
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Model System 
boundaries 
Top-down/ 
bottom-up 
Endogenous 
technology 
learning 
Objective Type Distinguishing features 
European models        
MARKAL Energy sector Bottom-up Yes To perform prospective analysis of 
long-term energy balances under 
different scenarios. 
Dynamic Energy System 
Optimisation. 
• Price elastic demand. 
• Endogenous technology learning. 
• System cost minimisation. 
NEMESIS  
   
  
Macro
economic 
Top-down No Assess for sectoral and macro-
economic impacts of European 
policies in the area of Energy, 
Environment and R&D. 
Neokeynesian macro econometric 
model with detailed energy/environ-
ment module for EU-15 countries + 
Norway. 
• 30 production sectors. 
• Endogenous taxes and tradable 
permits for 3 greenhouse gases. 
• Endogenous R&D decisions of firms. 
PACE Macro
economic 
 Top-down Endogenous
TC (under 
development) 
Assessment of economic and 
environmental impacts of climate 
change policies (cost-efficiency 
analysis). 
Multi-sector, multi-region dynamic 
computable general equilibrium 
(CGE) model. 
• Bottom-up foundation of power 
sector. 
• Rational expectations. 
PRIMES Energy sector Bottom-up  Forecasting, scenario construction and 
policy impact analysis. 
Partial equilibrium model of the EU 
energy system; hybrid model 
combining engineering orientation 
with economic market driven 
representations. 
• EU-25, Norway and Switzerland. 
TIMES-EE Energy sector Bottom-up  Technology assessment and 
evaluation of climate mitigation 
strategies in the European electricity 
sector. 
Energy System Optimisation, main 
focus on the electricity market. 
• Detailed power generation sector. 
• Detailed electricity exchange 
balances. 
• Consideration of CHP and electricity 
saving options. 
• EU-15, Norway, Switzerland, Poland 
and Czech Republic. 
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 APPENDIX B IMPLEMENTATION OF HARMONISED BASELINE 
ASSUMPTIONS IN MODELS 
B.1 PRIMES 
Input Source Remarks on if and how the translation was made 
GDP IPCC SRES B2 The GDP projections for EU-25 Member States are based on 
Economic and Financial Affairs DG forecasts of April 2002 for the 
short term (2001-2003);24 and on macroeconomic forecasts from 
WEFA,25 adjusted to reflect recent developments, for the horizon 
to 2030. Furthermore, for the EU-15 additional inputs were taken 
into account from Member States’ stability programmes and long-
term projections, stakeholders’ consultation,26 and the results of 
GEM-E3 model.27  
Population IPCC SRES B2 Population data from the B2 scenario family are based on the UN 
median 1998 population projections. 
Energy prices (oil 
and optionally coal)
POLES The values for the oil and coal prices provided by POLES were 
used. 
Overall discount 
rate 
Proposal ECN Not used in PRIMES. 
Three rates are currently used within the model. The first, used 
mostly for large utilities, is set at 8%; the second, used for large 
industrial and commercial entities, is set at 12%; the third, used for 
households in determining their spending on transportation and 
household equipment, is set at 17.5%. 
Policy assumptions  
Subsidies and taxes (not harmonised, 
please indicate if 
included) 
The Baseline scenario includes existing trends and the effects of 
policies in place and/or in the process of being implemented by the 
end of 2001; whereas tax rates reflect the situation of July 2002 in 
the EU-15 Member States.  
Coal  Proposal ECN All new coal plants have all Sulfur dioxide, NOx scrubbers as 
required by law. 
Nuclear  Proposal ECN Differences in current policies of all States as regards nuclear 
capacity, taking into account policy decisions as regards nuclear 
phase out in Belgium, Germany, and Sweden and plans concerning 
nuclear plant refurbishment/closure, as already agreed or under 
negotiation with the European Commission for the rest countries.28
                                                 
24  European Commission Economic forecasts, Spring 2002 (EUROPEAN ECONOMY. No. 2. 2002. Office for Offi-
cial Publications of the EC. ISBN92-894-3357-4; ISSN0379-0991). Also available at: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/europeaneconomy_en.htm. 
25  WEFA (now integrated into DRI-WEFA) is an economic consultancy company which, in the context of the Long 
Run Energy Modelling framework contract, was subcontracted by NTUA to deliver a consistent macro-economic 
and sectoral forecast over the horizon to 2020 for the EU-15 Member States and, at a more aggregate level, for 
candidate countries and EU neighbouring countries (Norway and Switzerland). This projection was delivered in 
March 2001 and has been used as a benchmark in the context of this study. 
26  Workshop on ‘Business-as-usual in energy intensive sectors beyond 2010’, organised by Commission services 
(DG-ENV and DG-TREN), March 2001. 
27  The GEM-E3 model has been constructed under the co-ordination of NTUA within collaborative projects sup-
ported by DG-RESEARCH involving CES-KULeuven and ZEW.  
28  Nuclear policy assumptions of Central and Eastern European countries were drawn from the information con-
tained in the 2001 Regular Reports from the Commission on Progress towards Accession, 13 November 2001 
(http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report2001/index.htm). 
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Renewable 
electricity 
Proposal ECN Energy policies that aim at promoting renewable energy (wind, 
small hydro, solar energy, biomass and waste) and co-generation 
are assumed to continue, involving subsidies on capital costs and 
preferential electricity selling prices. Rather than imposing the 
indicative targets of the EC renewables electricity Directive29 for 
each Member State, the Baseline includes the policy measures in 
view of such targets in each individual country. 
Sulphur policies IPCC SRES B2 It is assumed that stringent regulation for acid rain pollutants 
continues, especially for large combustion plants. Similarly, other 
clean air policies are assumed to continue. 
Climate policies Proposal ECN on 
Carbon value  
For the purposes of the study it is assumed that a carbon tax of 10 
Euro2000/tonne CO2 as from the year 2012 (constant value over 
time) was implemented in all States. 
Efficiency standards 
for cars 
 The effects from the voluntary agreement that was reached 
between the European Commission and the European automobile 
industry (followed in 1999 by similar agreements with Korean and 
Japanese car manufacturers). 
 
Concerning the use of biofuels in transportation, it was assumed 
that all countries would follow EU rules30 sooner or later. The 
impact of blending gasoline and diesel with biofuels on final 
consumer prices was assumed to be negligible, since higher fuel 
production costs will probably be offset by tax reductions 
scheduled to be implemented on these fuel blends. 
Other Efficiency 
improvement in all 
sectors. 
 
Energy intensity 
improvement 
 
 
 
Market 
liberalisation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Restructuring of 
power and steam 
generation 
Technological progress, induced both by economic growth and by 
modernisation of installations in all sectors of the economy, 
thereby improving the efficiency of the energy system. 
 
The restructuring of the sectoral pattern of economic growth, 
which gradually shifts away from traditional energy intensive 
sectors and concentrates on high value added activities, thereby 
improving energy intensity. 
 
The effects from restructuring of markets through the liberalisation 
of electricity and gas in the EU-15, which proceeds in line with EC 
directives; liberalisation is assumed to be fully implemented in the 
period to 2010.31 Liberalisation of electricity and gas markets is 
also assumed to take place in New Member States, Bulgaria, 
Norway, Romania, Turkey and Switzerland to attain compliance 
with EC directives in the medium term. 
 
The restructuring in power and steam generation, which is enabled 
by mature gas-based power generation technologies that are 
efficient, involve low capital costs and are flexible regarding plant 
size, co-generation and independent power production. 
 
                                                 
29  European Commission Directive 2001/77/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Promotion of 
Electricity Produced from Renewable Energy Sources in the Internal Electricity Market. Brussels, 27 September 
2001. 
30  European Commission Communication COM (2001) 547 of the European Commission of 07/11/01 on an action 
plan and two proposals for Directives to foster the use of alternative fuels for transport, starting with the regulatory 
and fiscal promotion of biofuels. Also at http://europa.eu.int/comm/energy/library/comm2001-547-en.pdf. 
31  This country-by-country modelling has focused on the dynamics of the energy system within a country, while con-
sidering trade in fuels between countries. An in-depth study of trade developments in electricity and gas would ne-
cessitate further work on the PRIMES model, which goes beyond the scope of this study. 
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 Are the results in line with your ‘usual’ baseline? 
• In our ‘usual’ baseline, it is assumed that no specific new policies and measures aimed at 
meeting Kyoto targets in 2008-2012, and possible more severe ones in the future, are im-
plemented over the next 25 years. Therefore, the implementation of the carbon tax leads the 
energy system to a different solution. 
 
Your judgement of robustness or an indication of sensitivities for specific assumptions: 
• Different energy prices as well as different macroeconomic assumptions can have a strong 
impact on the future evolution. 
• Policy towards energy efficiency and the promotion of renewable energy sources could 
change dramatically carbon emissions and improve security of supply. 
• Large uncertainties in the power sector concerning nuclear policies. 
 
Possible biases due to model mechanism or inputs: 
• In PRIMES model, consumer behaviour does not change easily. 
 
Policy messages: 
• The EU-30 energy system will need to deal with a number of major challenges over the next 
30 years, including issues related to security of supply, tightening environmental pressures, 
competitive energy prices and significant investment decisions. Even with a carbon tax of 10 
Euro2000/tonne CO2, CO2 emissions in EU-15 remain 4.9% above 1990 levels in 2010. 
 
B.2 PROMETHEUS 
Input Source Remarks on if and how the translation was made 
GDP IPCC SRES B2 IPCC SRES B2 scenario growth rates were used  
(GDP is expressed in ppp). 
Population  IPCC SRES B2 UN middle scenario projections were used. 
Energy prices (oil and 
optionally coal) 
POLES Prices are endogenous in PROMETHEUS. However the mean values 
for oil and coal were calibrated to POLES. 
Overall discount rate Proposal ECN Not applicable. 
Policy assumptions   
Subsidies and taxes (not harmonised, 
please indicate if 
included) 
Continuation of present used in real terms. 
Coal  Proposal ECN No specific policy. 
Nuclear  Proposal ECN As in ECN proposal. 
Renewable electricity Proposal ECN As in ECN proposal. 
Sulphur policies IPCC SRES B2 Not applicable. 
Climate policies Proposal ECN on 
Carbon value  
For the period 2005-2010:  
• EU: a carbon tax was assumed (Mean: 8.02 Euro/tonne CO2 
standard deviation: 6.08 Euro/tonne CO2) 
• Rest of OECD: a carbon tax was assumed (Mean: 1.6 Euro/tonne 
CO2 standard deviation: 3.2 Euro/tonne CO2) 
For the period 2011-2030:  
• EU: (Mean: 10.3 Euro/tonne CO2 standard deviation: 5.0 
Euro/tonne CO2) 
• Rest of OECD: a carbon tax was assumed (Mean: 7.2 Euro/tonne 
CO2 standard deviation:  
5.2 Euro/tonne CO2) 
• Rest of the World: a carbon tax was assumed  
(Mean: 1.6 Euro/tonne CO2 standard deviation:  
3.1 Euro/tonne CO2) 
Efficiency standards for cars Not applicable. 
Other   
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Figure B.1 Distributions in 2030 
 
The probability:  
• That GDP per capita in the Developing world will be more than one third of OECD GDP 
per capita in 2030 (currently it is less than one sixth) is slightly higher than 0.3%. 
• That the Middle East produces more than half of total world oil production in 2030 is 
slightly more than 85%. 
• That in the next 25 years there will be a price hike (over a short period) of more than (95)$ 
15 per barrel is nearly 50%. 
• That the international gas price is lower than the international oil price is around 95%. 
• That energy related CO2 emissions worldwide more than double between 1990 and 2030 is 
nearly 85%. 
• That there is on average de-carbonisation of world GIC between the present and 2030 is 
nearly 35%. 
 
The correlations of the main world energy economy aggregates are predominantly positive sug-
gesting a certain dominance of an axis: higher economic growth, higher consumption and higher 
energy prices. 
 
Are the results in line with your ‘usual’ baseline? 
• Main deviations from our usual baseline comes from higher growth in developing countries 
and lower in industrialised ones retained for CASCADE MINTS. 
 
Your judgement of robustness or an indication of sensitivities for specific assumptions: 
• PROMETHEUS results are based on a wide spectrum of possible outcomes by design. 
 
Possible biases due to model mechanism or inputs: 
• Could be due to the relative simplicity of model specification. The main source of bias could 
be due to possible biases in the basic common assumptions retained in CASCADE MINTS. 
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B.3 MARKAL 
Input Source Remarks on if and how the translation was made 
GDP IPCC SRES B2 Fully harmonized (exogenous input to the model). 
Population  IPCC SRES B2 Fully harmonized (exogenous input to the model). 
Energy prices (oil 
and optionally coal) 
POLES Fully harmonized world oil, gas and coal prices. 
Overall discount rate Proposal ECN 5%, consistent with ECN proposal. 
Policy assumptions   
Subsidies and taxes (not harmonised, 
please indicate if 
included) 
No taxes were included.  
Coal  Proposal ECN Dynamic limit on phase-out of coal (relaxed over time). 
Nuclear  Proposal ECN No limitations (capacity limits will be introduced in the new 
calibrated baseline). 
Renewable electricity Proposal ECN Lower limit of 18% renewables in electricity for Europe 
(constraints on electricity per fuel will be introduced during the 
ongoing calibration). 
Sulphur policies None No policies were included. 
Climate policies Proposal ECN on 
Carbon value  
€10 per ton CO2 included for all sources of CO2. 
Efficiency standards 
for cars 
 Accounted implicitly due to assumptions on energy intensity 
improvements in the mobility sector. 
 
B.4 MESSAGE 
Input Source Remarks on if and how the translation was made 
GDP IPCC SRES B2 Fully harmonized (exogenous input to the model). 
Population  IPCC SRES B2 Fully harmonized (exogenous input to the model). 
Energy prices (oil 
and optionally coal) 
POLES Endogenous. 
Overall discount rate Proposal ECN 5%, consistent with ECN proposal. 
Policy assumptions   
Subsidies and taxes (not harmonised, 
please indicate if 
included) 
No taxes were included.  
Coal  Proposal ECN Dynamic limit on phase-out of coal (relaxed over time). 
Nuclear  Proposal ECN No limitations (capacity limits will be introduced in the new 
calibrated baseline). 
Renewable electricity Proposal ECN Lower limit of 18% renewables in electricity for Europe 
(constraints on electricity per fuel will be introduced during the 
ongoing calibration). 
Sulphur policies IPCC SRES B2 Included as emissions constraints. 
Climate policies Proposal ECN on 
Carbon value  
We are operating with an aggregated OECD region, hence no 
carbon tax for Europe could be implemented.  
Efficiency standards 
for cars 
 Accounted implicitly due to assumptions on energy intensity 
improvements in the mobility sector. 
Other   
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 Are the results in line with your ‘usual’ baseline? 
• This is our central, dynamics-as-usual baseline scenario, which corresponds to the long-term 
median of the scenario literature for the most important driving forces and scenario results. 
 
Your judgement of robustness or an indication of sensitivities for specific assumptions: 
• Uncertainty with respect to the dynamics and pace of technological change, economic 
growth, and demographic change can lead to considerably different outcomes (particularly 
in the long term). For a quantification of the uncertainty range see alternative projections il-
lustrated in IPCC-SRES, 2000. 
• Climate policies would change the results significantly. 
 
Possible biases due to model mechanism or inputs: 
• Perfect foresight. 
 
Policy messages: 
• Global carbon emissions are going to increase considerably, if there is no international in-
centive (regulation) for mitigation. 
• Most of the growth in emissions is expected to occur in the developing world. 
• There is large inertia in the energy system. Hence, short-term action (technology trans-
fer/creation of niche markets) is needed to foster the introduction of advanced and cleaner 
technologies, in order to enable that these technologies play a significant role in the long 
term. 
 
For more details see Riahi and Roehrl, 2000. 
 
B.5 POLES 
Input Source Remarks on if and how the translation was made 
GDP IPCC SRES B2 The GDP is in pppEUR00, and it was not reconciliated with the 
SRES B2, as that is given in market prices. Comparison was made to 
the CMP2 baseline assumption pppGDP data, on the basis of the 
growth rates. Average differences are in the range of 0.2-0.4% 
amongst the given regions. (Considering that the CMP2 baseline 
assumptions are in 1990USD, the comparison is not straightforward).
Population  IPCC SRES B2 Same as UN reference case. 
Energy prices (oil 
and optionally coal)
POLES - 
Overall discount rateProposal ECN Not used in POLES, discount rates by technology. 
Policy assumptions   
Subsidies and taxes (not harmonised, 
please indicate if 
included) 
Subsidies are assumed to diminish in long term, so all prices will at 
least cover costs. 
Coal  Proposal ECN No limit on available resources. 
Nuclear  Proposal ECN Future restrictions are not included. 
Renewable 
electricity 
Proposal ECN The existing subsidies in place are considered in prices and costs. 
The target share of the EU (2001/77EC) is not included.  
Sulphur policies IPCC SRES B2 - 
Climate policies Proposal ECN on 
Carbon value  
The 10 Euro CV is in place for the EU 27 regions. 
Efficiency standards 
for cars 
 - 
Other  Renewable energy: assumed domestic energy sources , Nuclear 
energy: fuel assumed all imported, Household energy  demand 
values are included in the commercial sector, Biomass is in one 
category (no distinction is made for energy crops and residues). 
The regional exchange file cannot be filled - POLES has world pool 
for oil, three markets for gas - so the origin cannot be set.   
  The NMS region cannot be created with the present POLES, instead 
our CEUR region is given as the closest (see remark in the file). 
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Possible biases due to model mechanism or inputs: 
• Generally POLES baselines are coal intensive baselines, resulting in relatively higher carbon 
emissions.  
 
B.6 GMM 
Input Source Remarks on if and how the translation was made 
GDP IPCC SRES B2 Same as IPCC SRES B2 
Population  IPCC SRES B2 Same as IPCC SRES B2 
Energy prices (oil 
and optionally coal) 
POLES Energy prices are endogenous to the model. 
Overall discount 
rate 
Proposal ECN 5% 
Policy 
assumptions 
  
Subsidies and taxes (not harmonised, 
please indicate if 
included) 
Not included 
Coal  Proposal ECN Not included 
Nuclear  Proposal ECN It is assumed, that in 2050 the minimum nuclear power generation 
will remain at current global levels. 
Renewable 
electricity 
Proposal ECN Penetration of renewable technologies is bounded by their regional 
technological potential. 
Sulphur policies IPCC SRES B2 Not explicitly modelled. 
Climate policies Proposal ECN on 
Carbon value  
Carbon tax of 10€/tCO2 applied in the OOECD region. 
Efficiency standards 
for cars 
 Not included 
Other   
 
Are the results in line with your ‘usual’ baseline? 
• The underlying storyline for the reference development refers to the SRES-IIASA B2 ‘dy-
namics-as-usual’ case. The baseline end-use demands and renewable-energy potentials are 
directly taken from B2 scenario. However, no attempt has been undertaken to calibrate the 
baseline scenario to match the results of the SRES-B2 scenario. In this respect, the reference 
development corresponds to a PSI scenario, since the allocation of resources is based on an 
optimisation performed under conditions of perfect foresight with ‘learning-by-doing’ con-
siderations (LBD). The baseline is updated to reflect IEA statistics for the base year (2000). 
Cost specification of some technologies has been revised (e.g. nuclear- and hydro-power, 
hydrogen production). Additionally, carbon tax for OOECD region has been included in the 
Baseline. The results are comparable to our previous reference scenario. 
 
Your judgement of robustness or an indication of sensitivities for specific assumptions: 
• Since the ETL approach is applied in the power sector, the results regarding technology and 
fuel mix for electricity generation is highly dependant on the assumptions, particularly on 
progress ratios and growth rates for the different technologies. 
• The reference development for the power sector is coal-intensive. Thus, implementation of 
explicit sulphur policies might influence significantly results of baseline. 
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 Possible biases due to model mechanism or inputs: 
• There is a full global spillover of experience and knowledge transfer across regions assumed 
in the model. The limitation of ‘learning’ spillovers for selected technologies might change 
results of baseline. 
• Conservation measures are not explicitly modelled. 
 
Policy messages: 
• The baseline scenario remains in the median range of assumptions concerning socio-
economic and technological developments for mankind and is able to serve as basis for 
studying policies of interest for the CASCADE-MINTS project. The global primary energy 
consumption experiences a significant increase and is largely dominated by fossil fuels. 
Both coal and natural gas experience a substantial growth, with clean coal technology and 
gas becoming the predominant source by the end of the horizon. Growth of oil remains 
modest, but it continues to hold a significant contribution. Non-fossil resources slowly gain 
market share. At the global level, electricity generation experiences a vigorous growth with 
the bulk of this growth driven by developing regions. On the demand-side it is assumed that 
the historical shift from non-commercial to commercial fuels and towards more clean and 
flexible, grid-transported energy carriers at the final-energy level continue in the future. 
• Cumulative learning processes constitute important mechanisms of technological change 
and play a significant role in the diffusion of technologies. 
 
B.7 PACE 
Input Source Remarks on if and how the translation was made 
GDP IPCC SRES B2 Adjustments to convex growth profiles 
Population  IPCC SRES B2 Yes 
Energy prices (oil and 
optionally coal) 
POLES Yes 
Overall discount rate Proposal ECN Yes 
Policy assumptions   
Subsidies and taxes (not harmonised, 
please indicate if 
included) 
As of GTAP 5.4 
Coal  Proposal ECN No explicit policy 
Nuclear  Proposal ECN No explicit policy 
Renewable electricity Proposal ECN No explicit policy 
Sulphur policies IPCC SRES B2 No explicit policy 
Climate policies Proposal ECN on 
Carbon value  
Yes 
Efficiency standards 
for cars 
 No explicit policy 
Other   
 
The calibration of our intertemporal multi-sector, multi-region CGE model is based on the 
GTAP5.4 benchmark year 1997. We take this year to be the year 2000 and do a dynamic cali-
bration in 10-year periods. Due to the differences between 1997 values and 2000 values the ab-
solute level values of the model baseline may substantially differ from the MESSAGE reference 
baseline (based on the empirical values for 2000) although we employ the same growth rates. 
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B.8 NEWAGE-W 
Input Source Remarks on if and how the translation was made 
GDP IPCC SRES B2 Transformation of MESSAGE GDP from 1990 till 2030 into 
growth-rates for NEWAGE-W.  
Remark1: NEWAGE-W is calculating in $1997. For converting 
into €2000, it makes a difference, if you first inflate Dollar and than 
exchange it to Euro or the other way round. E.g. GDP for WEU in 
the year 2000 is 11730 GEUR2000 (Source: MESSAGE) but is 
9180 GEUR2000 (Source: PRIMES). The difference could be a 
result of that problem.  After all I used the conversion factor from 
the deflator.xls you sent us. This issue could cause some confusion.
Remark2: The assumptions for overall COAL Use/Production 
seems to be a little pessimistic. 
Remark3: Due to the COAL production projection, the world CO2 
emissions in 2030 are much lower than e.g. in POLES. This effect 
is intensified by smaller overall GDP growth-rates (compared to 
POLES). 
Remark4: Total CO2 emissions in 1990/2000 seem to be very high, 
concerning the given Primary Energy consumption in MESSAGE. 
Population  IPCC SRES B2 Population is not an input parameter for NEWAGE-W. 
Energy prices (oil 
and optionally coal) 
POLES Included 
Overall discount rate Proposal ECN 5% 
Policy assumptions   
Subsidies and taxes (not harmonised, 
please indicate if 
included) 
- 
Coal  Proposal ECN - 
Nuclear  Proposal ECN - 
Renewable 
electricity 
Proposal ECN - 
Sulphur policies IPCC SRES B2 - 
Climate policies Proposal ECN on 
Carbon value  
- 
Efficiency standards 
for cars 
 - 
Other  - 
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 B.9 TIMES-EE 
Input Source Remarks on if and how the translation was made 
GDP PRIMES / IEA Fully harmonized (exogenous input to the model) 
Population  PRIMES / IEA Fully harmonized (exogenous input to the model) 
Energy prices (oil 
and optionally coal)
Proposal ECN Fully harmonized (exogenous input to the model) 
Overall discount 
rate 
Proposal ECN 5%, consistent with ECN proposal 
Policy assumptions   
Subsidies and taxes (not harmonised, 
please indicate if 
included) 
Country-specific taxes (level of 2000) are included.  
Coal   National coal policies are reflected. 
Nuclear   National nuclear policies are reflected. 
Renewable 
electricity 
 National policies on renewables are reflected considering lower 
limit of different renewables in electricity per country. 
Sulphur policies  Included in technology description. 
Climate policies Proposal ECN on 
Carbon value  
Carbon tax for Europe is implemented. 
Efficiency standards 
for cars 
 Only electricity sector is considered. 
Other   
 
Are the results in line with your ‘usual’ baseline? 
• This is our central baseline scenario, which corresponds to other projections like IEA or 
European Energy and Transport Trends to 2030. 
 
Your judgement of robustness or an indication of sensitivities for specific assumptions: 
• Uncertainty with respect to the dynamics and pace of technological change, economic 
growth, and demographic change can lead to considerably different outcomes (particularly 
in the long term). 
• Climate policies or variations in energy policy assumptions would change the results signifi-
cantly. 
 
Possible biases due to model mechanism or inputs: 
• Perfect foresight 
• Competitive markets. 
 
Policy messages: 
• Carbon emissions of the electricity sector in Europe are going to increase considerably, if 
there is no strong international or european incentive (regulation) for mitigation. 
• Most of the growth in emissions is expected to occur in the electricity sector of Southern 
Europe and of Germany and the Netherlands. 
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B.10 NEMESIS 
Input Source Remarks on if and how the translation was made 
GDP IIASA B2 Scenario for 
Western Europe 
 
Population  For European area: 
growth of 0.34% for 
2000/1990, 0.16% for 
2010/2000 and 0,04% for 
2020/2010 
 
Energy prices (oil 
and optionally coal) 
POLES  
Overall discount rate 5%  
Policy assumptions   
Subsidies and taxes (not harmonised)  
Climate policies ECN’s proposal on 
climate policy, by 
assuming a carbon tax of 
10Euro2000/tonne CO2 
from 2012 onwards. 
 
Efficiency standards 
for cars 
Effects from volontary 
agreements between 
European Commission 
and the automobile 
industry 
ACEA/JAMA/KAMA) 
are incorporated. 
 
Other   
 
The guidelines for baseline harmonisation were introduced in the bottom-up module of NEME-
SIS (NEMESIS-EnergyEnvironmentModule, NEEM). 
 
This Energy/environment module is rather detailed (see baseline results sheet A_base), but with 
the following limitations: 
1. It does not distinguish biomass energy corps and residues; instead we have a global category 
biomass. Biomass consumption and production are model results. 
2. NEMESIS EEM does not include a precise CHP representation and only approximations can 
be provided. However the fuel for power generation includes the fuels consumed in CHP 
plants. 
3. Hydrogen economy is not yet modelled, thus no hydrogen production can be reported. 
4. Shadow prices for gas, oil and coal cannot be reported by NEMESIS EEM (There are no 
constraints in the model for oil, gas and coal production). 
5. Also total system cost cannot be provided. Only investment cost in the power generation 
sector. 
6. Finally regional exchanges are not modelled. 
 
NEMESIS EEM takes as major inputs GDP, sectoral productions, households’ final consump-
tion, long term interest rates projections, from the top-down economic model (sheet B_TD). The 
economic model baseline is currently being actualised, and the baseline results displayed on 
sheets A_base and B_TD will be modified during the project; they are thus at this stage only in-
dicative on the kind of outputs NEMESIS could provide. 
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 The current economic baseline was built in 2002/2003 using the following assumptions: 
• External trade: The world economy was expected to recover after 2003, with sustained 
growth of China supposed to increase its imports following its entry in WTO.. Asian new 
developing countries and India were supposed to benefit as well of rising sources of eco-
nomic growth. In the OPEC, structural reform was expected to give increasing support to 
growth making these countries more attractive to foreign investors. For NAFTA, Mexico 
was supposed to continue stimulate the economic activity in this area and besides, United 
States and Canada were expected to reinforce strongly there growth. For Japan, banking and 
structural problems were supposed to continue to limit growth potentials during the decade. 
Sustained growth perspective were expected as well for accessing countries and rest eastern 
European countries. 
• World prices: they were supposed to grow about 2% per annum, with constant exchange 
rates after 2002. 
• Demographic assumptions: In European area, in coherency with World Bank projections, 
population was forecasted to stay relatively stable, implying a potential drop of working 
population 
• Technical progress: Rates are differentiated by country and production sectors, and driven 
by R&D expenditures of firms, which were supposed to increase slightly their research ef-
fort in reaction to international competition and the limitation of labour supply. 
• Interest rates: Nominal rates are still exogenous in the model, and supposed to stay constant 
at 5%. 
• Government Consumption and production of non market services: European states were 
supposed to continue to reduce their government consumption, and to limit the progression 
of social expenditures, which were supposed to progress less quickly than GDP after 2010. 
 
The baseline scenario exhibits a strong growth until 2010, pulled-up by extra-European exports 
(not reported in sheet B_td) as result of global world economic recovery. In relation with demo-
graphic assumptions and economic growth, expected decrease of unemployment leads to a sus-
tained growth of real wages and final consumption, despite the relatively slow rise of total em-
ployment. For energy, final intensity was supposed to decrease in response to R&D activities 
despite a negative (price) substitution effect; for intermediate energy consumption, no gains 
were expected. Finally, intra-European trade was supposed to continue to reinforce. 
 
For the rest of the period (after 2010), extra European trade was supposed to reduce progres-
sively its growth rate, while World economies are supposed to evolve from strong growth to po-
tential growth rates, and the gap between growth rates of world regions to reduce equally pro-
gressively. 
 
At a sectoral level, equipment goods industries were supposed to accompany growth expansion 
while transportation and market services continue to increase their contribution to overall eco-
nomic activity, and continued declining contributions of agriculture and intermediate industries, 
at the exception of chemistry (which includes also pharmacy). 
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B.11 DNE21+ 
Input Source Remarks on if and how the translation was made 
GDP IPCC SRES B2 Growth rate of GDP/capita from SRES B2 is used to obtain 
GDP/capita data for the four regions, and then the GDP/capita is 
multiplied with the national population to obtain GDP for each 
nation. 
Population  IPCC SRES B2 Population data by nation of TGCIA(Task Group on Scenarios for 
Climate Assessment ) are used. 
Energy prices (oil 
and optionally coal) 
 Production cost curves are assumed for fossil fuels according to 
Rogner, 1997. Their prices are determined endogenously. 
Overall discount 
rate 
 5%/year 
Policy assumptions   
Subsidies and taxes  Not included 
Coal   Not included 
Nuclear   Not included  
Renewable 
electricity 
Proposal ECN Lower bounds of renewable electricity generation for the EU are 
adopted according to ADMIRE-REBUS until 2010 and not 
thereafter. 
Sulphur policies  Not included 
Climate policies Proposal ECN on 
Carbon value  
10 Euro/tonne CO2 is adopted for the EU after 2010. 
Efficiency standards 
for cars 
 Not applicable 
Other  Change rate in hydro power generation is limited within ± 5%/y 
for every region. 
 
Which results are in your opinion worth highlighting? 
• The DNE21+ is a 77 region global model of optimization type, a developed version of the 
DNE21 model. The DNE21+ distinguishes 54 countries and energy-environment policies of 
these countries are evaluated consistently and on the same basis; interregional energy trade 
is allowed including coal, crude oil, natural gas, methanol, hydrogen and electricity. 
 
Are the results in line with your ‘usual’ baseline? 
• The results are new but very similar at world level to those of the DNE21 which is reliable 
in our view. 
 
Your judgement of robustness or an indication of sensitivities for specific assumptions. 
• FC vehicles are treated in a tricky way to see how and when the hydrogen substitutes for 
gasoline. The assumption of their cost reduction affects the results pretty much. 
 
Possible biases due to model mechanism or inputs. 
• The model seeks for the future normative in the perfect foresight. 
 
Policy messages 
• Nuclear should phase out in no climate policy. Nuclear decreases and then disappears in our 
baseline results. 
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 B.12 NEMS 
Input Source Remarks on if and how the translation was made 
GDP IPCC SRES B2 GDP is based on the US DOE/EIA baseline input assumptions as 
provided by the Global Insight ‘mid’ case; definition is based on 
US government published statistics. The resulting GDP results 
from the ‘mid-growth’GDP case of Global Insight and used in the 
US DOE revised reference case of April 24, 2004.  Since the 
resulting GDP is adjusted slightly by the feedback with the US 
energy market, GDP is partly a derived result. That white paper 
suggested that the two measures of GDP (one used by the EU and 
the one used by the US government) are different and 
reconciliation may not be reasonably possible.   
Population  IPCC SRES B2 Same as UN reference case. 
Energy prices (oil 
and optionally coal) 
POLES Energy prices in NEMS are internal to the model with partial 
exception of world oil prices.  
Overall discount rate Proposal ECN Not used in NEMS – discount rates set by technology, end-use 
customer class. 
Policy assumptions   
Subsidies and taxes (not harmonised, 
please indicate if 
included) 
All existing US federal and state taxes and incentive policies have 
been implemented for the US. 
Coal  Proposal ECN NA - all new coal plants have all Sulfur dioxide, NOx scrubbers as 
required by law. 
Nuclear  Proposal ECN NA – allowed to compete but does not penetrate market. 
Renewable electricity Proposal ECN Used all existing State and Federal incentives. 
Sulphur policies IPCC SRES B2 Existing Clean Air Act Regulations as enacted. 
Climate policies Proposal ECN on 
Carbon value  
NA 
Efficiency standards 
for cars 
 Use existing CAFÉ standards for new cars and light trucks. 
Other Electricity pricing 
and regulation 
Deregulated/regulated Electricity markets as currently represented 
by individual state policies/laws. 
 
Are the results in line with your ‘usual’ baseline? 
• This is our usual but updated baseline, since we agreed that anything endogenous would be 
left alone. 
 
Your judgement of robustness or an indication of sensitivities for specific assumptions 
• Assumed natural gas resource base in the US is an important uncertainty as is the ability of 
OPEC to stay cohesive. Also, since WOP are determined more by political factors than pro-
duction cost, actual WOP’s are uncertain, based on availability of alternative (unconven-
tional supplies from non-OPEC) and alternative technologies, (Coal to liquids and gas to 
liquids). 
• Carbon policy could dramatically change results of baseline. 
• New efficiency standards or CAFÉ standards could dramatically change carbon emissions. 
 
Possible biases due to model mechanism or inputs 
• Model assumes consumer behaviour does not change easily (i.e., effective hurdle rates and 
basis for decisions remain unchanged in the forecast period) 
 
Policy messages 
• Voluntary programs don’t do very well in most of US markets. 
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